



# INDIA'S CASE FOR FREEDOM

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CHAPTER I

**India and the World Order**

The principal intention and purpose of the following pages is to illustrate and emphasize the point that India's freedom is not only an imperative necessity, absolutely speaking, but that it should constitute an integral part of the war strategy and the peace plans of the United Nations. I want to emphasize and impress the view-point that it is an indispensable preliminary to post-war world reconstruction on a satisfactory and enduring basis. To the foreigner the problem of India is a maze of complexities in which minorities, special interests, internal differences and so on form an endless, confusing and incoherent procession. But it will be clear on a little deeper consideration that most, if not all, of these complexities and difficulties are the interested propagandist's fantasies and given a will on one side and good-will on the other they will dissipate and dissolve like mist before sunshine.

In considering the problem of India we must consider it in relation to the general situation appertaining to the war, which is still too much with us now and overshadows and overwhelms everything else at the present moment. Victory, full and unqualified, in that war for the United Nations and the extinction of the Axis totalitarianism, both in Europe and Asia; as a military creed as well as the basis of a new "World Order" are of paramount importance. This proposition is

accepted in all parts of the world in which the yearning for freedom is prevalent, in which the light of liberty shines undimmed and which appreciate the consideration that a contrary position would entail the reversion of the world as a whole to a state of semi-elemental barbarism. The Axis nations may grandiloquently proclaim their war aims and peace objectives as the establishment of what they call a "World Order" and of "co-prosperity spheres." But that these terms are devoid of any significance which can hearten men and inspire in them hope of a bright future, but are mere nomenclature designed either to dupe the unwary and the gullible who may still exist anywhere in the world or to force others who are helpless and down-trodden into acceptance of a political philosophy, in the rejection of which they have no choice or from which they have no escape, is not only amply borne out by hard experience but supported by incontestable evidence. A large section of the people in three continents has too distressing an experience of Hitler and his assurances, of Nippon and Company and their sweet promises to be imposed upon by anything they put forward as their aims. The allurements of the Axis New Order and of the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere adumbrated by Japan are, therefore, overwhelmingly rejected as veritable spider's webs. They will increasingly be abhorred as the war draws to its inevitable climax, since they involve grave peril to humanity's progress and civilization. Finally to prevent German Nazism and Japanese militarism from achieving their hearts' desires and thus forcing the world to

recede some centuries behind the clock is an imperative, undeniable desideratum. Before this need, all other considerations and controversies should pale into insignificance, and it is a need which will have to be pursued relentlessly till victory is won and at the Peace Conference afterwards.

But the Allied Nations, which have set themselves resolutely to the task of the extinction of the Axis designs, should ask themselves the question: what can we oppose to the New Order, so flamboyantly proclaimed by the Axis partners, which will successfully mobilize and capitalize international public opinion against them, both physically and morally? Is it enough to oppose to it the merely negative idea that the Axis New Order, if it had been allowed to be established, will involve the extinction of the torch of human freedom and the obliteration of all the ideals of life and conduct which humanity considers noble and exalted? To a certain extent, but to a certain extent only, it may be helpful if it is perseveringly dinned into the world's ears that the defeat of the Axis is in itself the sole and pre-eminent objective of the Allies. But while it may perhaps partially satisfy public opinion in the present and immediate future, it simply cannot supply the whole of the moral and psychological anti-Axis momentum that the situation even now demands. The argument alone cannot cover up the lacunæ that the Axis New Order is inherent with and for which it has been rejected overwhelmingly. It cannot be the whole argument with which the Axis propagandistic efforts can be



countered. Rightly did Mr. Churchill maintain that the present war is not merely a war between nations as the last war. It is more of a revolution than a war, he pointed out: "A revolutionary war waged by Hitler and his totalitarian war machine against all other nations and the free world in which we have lived so as to make them military, political and economic satellites in a totalitarian world empire." It is basically and principally a war between two ideas and ideals, two systems of political philosophy, two ways of life. For victory therein, those who stand for the democratic system and the democratic way of life must do everything to demonstrate that it is superior and better in its scope and content and more beneficial in its results than the Fascist and the Nazi systems with their supreme contempt for human freedom and individual rights. It is essential that something decisively positive, something unambiguously purposeful, clearly adequate, effective and inherently attractive and morally grand should be opposed to them so that detestation for the totalitarian conception of things already great over wide territories, will be maximized and the moral indignation of the world against Nazi and Japanese rapacities will lead to a full realization, by contrast, of the democratic ideal and way of living.

The war, as I said, must be won and the Axis partners laid by the heels at the earliest possible moment. But if there is one factor more important and essential than this, it is the winning of the peace, the laying down of the foundations of democratic World Order, in contradistinction to

The Axis "World Order," in which political freedom for small as well as big nations will be assured, economic disparities among people and economic inequalities among countries will be ironed out as much as possible, social justice will prevail and man will be able to speak to man as well as nation to nation not in a spirit of inferiority or superiority, dependence or hegemony, but each person and each nation can function as entities contributing individually to the sum total of human happiness. We do not want the predominance of any particular 'ism' but we must strive for the common 'ism' of humanity and human happiness and human progress. It is possible that all this may sound fantastic and utopian and though the ideal may be accepted, the hurdles on the way may prove insurmountable. There are indeed long-standing prejudices, old-time prepossessions, established modes of thought and life among nations and their leaders which have to be overcome before the picture set out can take real shape. But let it not be forgotten that men have been ceaselessly striving towards these very ends through the centuries. They have fought wars, sacrificed themselves in thousands and millions for attaining these lofty ends and aims. If there have been disappointments and failures, and if to-day we are as far as ever before from attaining the conditions in which these ideals are translated into practice, that is attributable partly to the selfishness of the few who had been in charge of men's affairs everywhere and partly to the fact that mankind itself as a whole is not yet sufficiently developed and advanced in its moral stature to

enjoy the fruits of those ideals, though it is continuously impressed by their ennobling character.

The termination of the present war may also witness such disappointments and failures—we already hear of vital differences between war-time allies like Britain and U.S.A. and Russia. But their extensiveness can be minimized and the world taken many steps along the road to the realization of man's hopes if those who are now in charge of the destinies and policies of nations do not allow narrow-minded prejudices, personal or class or national ambitions to predominate over humanity's vital interests and to swamp them. They should be unambiguously clear in their mind as to what it is they are striving for and what it is the world is anxious for. Humanity is anxious for peace and not war: that proposition is incontestable. It is not anxious, however, for a condition of technical warlessness coupled with the continuance of a state of inequality among nations, freedomlessness for certain countries, superior and inferior nations and superior and inferior races of men, in short, the perpetuation of the *status quo*. A peace settlement in which this state of affairs will not cease to be will be as bad as, if not worse than, a state of war and conflict and decimation. It will be as bad as that because it is a state of affairs which inheres a perpetual potential danger of war and, what is worse from certain points of view, a perpetual state of dissatisfaction, incipient revolution, and psychological unsettlement among large sections of the world's population, which render the term 'peace' a mockery. It is, therefore, essential to

be clear in our minds what we are striving for and what are the conditions necessary for success in such striving. We must be resolutely opposed to war and not merely strive in vain for what may prove to be a peaceless peace.

If the leaders of the United Nations like President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and M. Stalin fail to rise to expectations in this regard, it will be a catastrophe which will have incalculably deleterious consequences, which should, therefore, be scrupulously avoided, if necessary, by the public opinion, the voice of the common people of these countries asserting itself with all the strength that it can muster. If the leaders of nations refuse to appreciate these all-important, vital considerations that the situation presents before them, they will be committing a crime on humanity for which there can be precious little penitence or possibility of condonation by the present or the future generations.

The imperative and insistent questions that arise in this connection were never more emphatically and unambiguously asked than by Mr. Wendell Willkie, who, sometime before his recent unfortunate death, undertook a tour of the Middle East and China at the instance of President Roosevelt. "How shall we determine what we want to win in the next peace? And how shall we prepare to win it during the war," he asked in the course of an article in the New York *Herald Forum* later incorporated in his now-famous book 'One World.' The questions were addressed mainly to those who maintained that the fighting of the war must be left exclusively to experts and

that laymen should not dabble in matters involving high military strategy. Undoubtedly, warfare in modern, as much as in ancient, times is the concern principally of strategists and commanders. But if wars are planned and fought by experts, war and peace are made by politicians and laymen and, therefore, it follows as a self-evident factor that the coming peace will necessarily be formulated by laymen. It is indubitable that the principles on which the foundations of peace can be securely laid will be conditional on the prior victory in war of the United Nations—a victory which they are fast winning to all intents and purposes. The implications of this fundamental, almost elementary-looking, proposition, however, involve automatically the acceptance of the inevitable conclusion that the greatest possible care, attention and thought will have to be devoted to the evolution of those principles. It must be remembered constantly and continuously that the 'war to end war' which was the description given to the 1914—18 armageddon, actually turned out to be a war for the outbreak of another war on a vaster scale, that it was the insufferable blunderings of politicians, the cupidity of narrow-minded nationalists, the regrettable absence of a broad vision and a big heart in those who had to implement the Versailles Peace Treaty, as well as the callous disregard in practice of the high and noble objectives, which should have been unerringly and undeviatingly adhered to by those who had the management of international assemblies like the League of Nations in their hands, that were responsible for the rise of the phenomenon of Dictator

Hitler and his maniacal pursuit of territorial aggrandizements and in human racial vendettas now happily brought to a standstill. Those who fought and won World War No. I sacrificed precious lives for the sake of exceptionable ideals. But those who made the peace and administered it had little compunction in literally transforming those very sacrifices into footholds for the realization of personal or national ambitions and had callously permitted things to deteriorate to a level where humanity is constrained to pass through the grueling and horrible experiences of the present World War No. II.

The fact was that among the European statesmen, during the period following the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles, robust idealism and earnest and purposeful broadmindedness were but skin-deep. They accepted the principle of and helped to establish the League of Nations; but they failed to discover the key to the secret of its successful functioning. They had an indistinct vision of an international order for which they aspired but they allowed the immediate and more alluring prospects of national security to obscure and obliterate even that vision. They had vague and ill-digested notions of a world order based on collective security, international peace and disarmament. But in actual practice the ideal of collective security degenerated into an anxious hugging of the narrow conception of national security; international peace deteriorated into a process of buying time and again a humiliating peace at the hands of recalcitrants like Hitler who never made a fetish of peace but feverishly prepar-

ed for war ; and disarmament meant nothing more than vindictive deprivation of armaments of the vanquished nations to the point of making them utterly desperate and forcing them to indulge in clandestine rearmament, which ultimately found the victors napping and caught them in its deadly coils. It was all a despicable history of historical opportunities missed, misused or abused.

All these are now admitted to be profound and large-scale blunders which European statesmen posing as leaders of a 'New Order' committed, some consciously and others unconsciously. But propably it is not entirely their fault if they committed them. After all they were, to a large extent, the instruments of the national will and public opinion of the countries which they represented and the national will and public opinion of European nations in the third and fourth decades of the present century were not adequately developed to appreciate the far-reaching significance of and the need for high principles on which the superstructure of a true international order ought to be constructed. The idea of international co-operation and sacrifice of something of national sovereignty for achieving it implicit in the League of Nations was beyond the understanding of the common man or even of the common run of statesmen, and, therefore, it was in effect much in advance of the times in which it originated. The instinct prone to international peace and collective security was there ; but the will and the moral capacity necessary to enforce its implementation were lacking. The League of Nations, therefore, became a structure in stone disembodied of its moving

and guiding spirit. Herein we have the clearest possible explanation of both the cause of its failure and of the effect of that failure in the thunderous outbreak of the present armageddon. Now again the present war has stirred men's moral and spiritual consciences to their depths and among the political philosophers and thinkers in Britain, America and the European countries a widespread appreciation is prevalent of the pre-eminent need for resuscitating the League of Nations' ideal. But while the political philosopher is wide-awake, the politician may again prove to be the fly in the ointment. It is the one grave danger to be guarded against in the winning of the peace.

The incapacity of the European statesmen to live up to the ideals which inspired the League's formation was the main cause for the debacle that overtook that body. But it was not the sole cause for the unfortunate result. European nations like Britain, France and Russia, which held a dominant position in the League's counsels and in the direction of its affairs, showed little disposition to transform it into a really comprehensive world organisation. That would have meant a challenge to their conception of national glory and they would not have it. To the Asiatic and African countries in particular, the League represented a mere idea and a vague one at that ; it was to them an institution in the fortunes of which they could claim very little share and in the functioning of which they evince precious little effective interest, except as contributors to its finances or as appendages of one or other of the big European nations. India has been, for pur-



poses of outward form, an original member of the League of Nations ; so also is China. But paradoxically enough an original member of the League like India is in reality only a 'subordinate' member of the British Empire and, therefore, incapacitated from making any independent decision or taking an independent line of her own. India's representatives to the League of Nations Assembly were the nominees of the Secretary of State for India and the British Government and their function in League meetings was more or less confined to raising their hands in support of Britain's point of view whenever fundamental questions came up for review or discussion. The international position accorded to India, even when she was recognized as an original member of the League, was thus wholly inconsistent with her internal political status of dependence on Britain and within the British Empire scheme. Her inherent capacity to influence or promote decisions was almost nil. China's position in pre-war international councils might have been slightly better than India's but not very much more influential or important and she was more tolerated than respected, a role which she has in recent years completely reversed by virtue of her enormous sacrifices and by her sheer, uncompromising and determined resistance to Japanese aggression.

A professedly international organization like the League, from the councils of which the then powerful nations like the United States and Germany had excluded themselves and in which huge continents like Asia and Africa were forced to occupy but an insignificant status, automatical-

poseful ? While it is true that some of the glaring drawbacks which made themselves manifest in the functioning of the League of Nations have been eliminated, as, for example, the inability of peace-loving nations to muster sufficient armed strength to overawe a would-be aggressor the Dumbarton Oaks Conference makes future peace dependent on collaboration principally and preliminarily of the Big Three or the Big Four. How that immense authority vested in these Big Powers will be utilised by them and how much idealism they will import into the discharge of their great obligations for maintenance of peace are questions which only time can show.

## CHAPTER II

### **India and the Atlantic Charter**

Visualizing the position from the standpoint of a nationalist Indian without any particular bias or prepossessions, I must express the conviction that the war aims and peace aims of the United Nations in general and of Britain in particular, such as have been announced so far, fail to convince India that she can wax enthusiastic over them. This conviction is based not on mere sentiment but on the foundation of solid and refutable facts and considerations. As soon as the war broke out India had been declared a belligerent as a matter of course because she is a dependency of Great Britain. It is well known that this automatically imposed belligerency has been a sore point with Indian nationalist opinion and has been regarded as an outrage on India's self-respect. It is, however, a coincidence, a welcome coincidence nevertheless, that her national ideals accord and are compatible with the ideals for which the United Nations profess to be engaged in the war. It is also a welcome coincidence that, as the war progressed and developed, it has developed in such a way, especially subsequent to the Japanese declaration of hostilities, that the preservation of her national integrity and security has become progressively more and more intertwined and more and more irrevocably bound up with the fortunes of the United Nations. Her sympathies with the war-torn, dismembered and

hard-pressed China are very real and very sincere—an important factor which serves to strengthen the ties which unite her to the cause of other Allied Powers, which are assisting China to extricate herself from the grip of the Japanese octopus.

As against these impelling considerations must be set the regrettable fact that her political subordination to Britain and the latter's attitude of irresponsiveness to her clearly and unequivocally expressed national aspirations have deeply distressed and disappointed this country. The war is being professedly fought for the liberation of all the dictator-ridden countries in Europe—*vide* Mr. Churchill's statement on the Atlantic Charter's application to India—but India must consent to be dealt with according to the sweet will of Britain herself and solely on her own responsibility. The war may be fought for ensuring the economic independence, political freedom and national security of European countries; but India must await the pleasure of Britain for securing for herself the advantage and benefit of these very fundamental conceptions. That is the plain meaning of the interpretation put on the applicability of the much discussed but, according to President Roosevelt, non-existent Atlantic Charter to India by Mr. Churchill, which he had not considered necessary to modify even after his co-signatory's subsequent statement, that its ideals and principles applied to the whole of humanity. The essential incompatibility between profession and practice is in no other case more expressively and more vividly evident than in the manner in

will encompass Hitler's and Japan's defeat. But evidently he is over-obsessed by the feeling with regard to India that Indians as a nation cannot be entrusted with any genuine responsibility for the administration of their country during the war time because certain sections of them have, for political reasons, displayed opposition to war efforts in the existing circumstances. He, however, fails to appreciate the essential, probably the central, factor in the anti-Axis strategy, which will make a pro-Allied victory certain and bring it appreciably nearer, when he tars all India with the same brush, when he flourishes the big stick at this country, when he announces, without a qualm, that the principles of the Atlantic Charter are inapplicable to India and that in any case if such lukewarmness or indifference as exists in this country are to be energized into purposeful activity, conciliation is essential. Unless we are to believe that he has studiously cultivated an essentially one-track mind which prevents him from visualizing the other side of the shield or even recognizing that there is another side to it at all, the incompatibility, nay the direct contradiction, between the commission with which he has been expressly charged and his observation in his Mansion House speech in 1942 that Britain intended to hold on to what she has and that he was not prepared to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire would not have escaped him. The simple, straightforward fact is that he has, wittingly or unwittingly, announced to the world when he made that statement that the principal war aim of Britain, at least so far as he

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tions had been able to equip fighting men by a million without being flummoxed by the equipment impediment. It is doubtful, however, Mr. Churchill ever considered the question from this point of view, or if he or the Government in India ever cared to estimate the potential increase in recruitment for the fighting forces if Indian co-operation is maximized by the unequivocal recognition of India's inalienable claims.

Mr. Churchill is the first Minister of the British Crown invested with almost dictatorial authority to devise measures and formulate policies which

will encompass Hitler's and Japan's defeat. But evidently he is over-obsessed by the feeling with regard to India that Indians as a nation cannot be entrusted with any genuine responsibility for the administration of their country during the war time because certain sections of them have, for political reasons, displayed opposition to war efforts in the existing circumstances. He, however, fails to appreciate the essential, probably the central, factor in the anti-Axis strategy, which will make a pro-Allied victory certain and bring it appreciably nearer, when he tars all India with the same brush, when he flourishes the big stick at this country, when he announces, without a qualm, that the principles of the Atlantic Charter are inapplicable to India and that in any case if such lukewarmness or indifference as exists in this country are to be energized into purposeful activity, conciliation is essential. Unless we are to believe that he has studiously cultivated an essentially one-track mind which prevents him from visualizing the other side of the shield or even recognizing that there is another side to it at all, the incompatibility, nay the direct contradiction, between the commission with which he has been expressly charged and his observation in his Mansion House speech in 1942 that Britain intended to hold on to what she has and that he was not prepared to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire would not have escaped him. The simple, straightforward fact is that he has, wittingly or unwittingly, announced to the world when he made that statement that the principal war aim of Britain, at least so far as he

is concerned, is the inconceivable one of preserving her empire in tact come what may. It is impossible, however, to believe that this can be the case, that Britain is pitting her whole might and resources against Axis aggrandizement over a vast area in Europe and the East, merely to retain her inextricable grip over other countries like India, control over which she has acquired much before either Germany or Japan did theirs over large parts of Europe and the Pacific and South-East Asia. The fundamental impossibility of the position, the ethical and moral discrepancy that it inheres, are painfully patent and many Englishmen themselves must have been flabbergasted at that time and continue to be flabbergasted by so blatant an assertion of the Imperialist creed on the part of the British Prime Minister.

On the other hand the impression generated by Mr. Churchill's statement referred to will not be obliterated but will only be strengthened by his subsequent pronouncements which indicate a distinct proneness to concentration of outlook, now happily modified to a large extent, on the progress of war in the European Continent and to accord to the situation in the Far East a somewhat secondary place. There was indeed cause for intense satisfaction in the course of events subsequent to the Allied invasion of French North Africa for Mr. Churchill as well as for most of us who wish well of the United Nations. Nevertheless there was little justification for his prescribing different time-tables for the completion of the destruction of the Axis partners in the West and the East. To the layman it is perfectly evident

that the present war is a global war and has to be considered as such. It does not admit of hemispherical division, if all the United Nations are to derive equal advantage from the co-operation they are extending in and the colossal sacrifices they are making for its prosecution. Mr. Churchill's outlook on the war strategy revealed in his statement after the North African campaign referred to above commenced is representative of the outlook which dominates his treatment of India's case as it was the outlook which inspired the construction he put on the Atlantic Charter's application. To him India is a country to be hectorated into acquiescence of whatever Britain deems fit for her. His mentality towards India at present is more or less the same as the mentality which inspired his insistent and strenuous opposition to even the moderate reform implicit in the Government of India Act of 1935. That there is grave danger in this hour of crisis for humanity involved in that outlook may not be visualized by him, but it is a self-evident proposition to others not equally prepossessed like large sections of the United States, as represented by Mr. William Philips' letter to the President, and it is particularly so to the people of the East in general and of India in particular.

It presages no good to Britain's national prestige and does little credit to her international morality if her principal peace aim is to be comprehended as one of preserving British Imperialism unimpaired and no one can be blamed for drawing that conclusion from the speeches of her Prime Minister. The term



'Imperialism' leaves a perfectly bad odour in the mouth in whatever sense or context it is used and Mr. Churchill's statements regarding India are essentially an Imperialist's statements in defence of the doctrine of Imperialism. If any British politician justifies that attitude on the ground that British policy towards her colonies or dependencies is actuated by wholly altruistic motives, it will put precious little ice in the fifth decade of the twentieth century and particularly after the disastrous blow that Britain's colonial policy received along with the fate that overtook Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong. The theory of one nation or people holding the trusteeship of or the mandate for other peoples and countries for the purpose of utilizing that trusteeship for the economic advancement and political progress of the latter has been blown sky-high as a result of these experiences. Trusteeship is neither wanted by the peoples for whose benefit it is supposedly intended nor can it be exercised satisfactorily by those who profess to exercise it for the benefit of others. To attempt to defend that theory and its practice will, therefore, be fundamentally to invite the ridicule that its underlying principle is to justify exploitation. Britain and America are the most important among the United Nations possessing colonies and dependencies. On them rests the grave moral responsibility of giving a lead in this matter of far-reaching significance to the future world reconstruction by emancipating from political dependence and economic exploitation those territories which they hold under subjection, political or economic. Thus alone can

they prove true to the principles of the so-called Atlantic Charter in the economic sphere and thus alone will the doubts created by Mr. Churchill's assertion be eliminated and Britain's *bona fides* established beyond doubt and cavil. The United States has to a large extent liquidated suspicions about her colonial policy by President Roosevelt's declaration about Phillippine independence after their emancipation from Japanese grip.

The proclaimed views of Mr. Churchill, as the Chief Minister of the Crown, with regard to the Atlantic Charter and India's participation in its benefits ill-accord with Britain's professed claim that she has promised dominion status with right of secession to India, as well as the right to frame her own constitution. They are incompatible with Mr. Amery's oft-repeated assertion that India would be in a position to enjoy after the war as much freedom as Britain herself within the framework of the British Commonwealth of Nations. They are not on all fours too with the statement in the King's speech at the opening of Parliament in November, 1942 that "my Government in the United Kingdom have declared to the Princes and the peoples of India their desire to see India assume full freedom and independence within the British Commonwealth of Nations on the basis of a constitution framed by Indians themselves immediately after the termination of the hostilities." Mr. Churchill will have to explain it, how far the laudable sentiments incorporated in the King's speech, in the composing of which he must have had a prominent hand, accord with his own expressed views on the

subject of India. But the most important thing is the adjustment of performance to promise, the concretization of assurance into definite acts of policy, not to elevate distrust and diehardism into state policy, which betrays a misreading of Britain's own past relations with the American Colonies, South Africa, Canada and lastly Ireland. In this respect and other respects there are snags. The most conspicuous of these was picturesquely expressed by Mahatma Gandhi when he characterized the British War Cabinet's offer to India, brought over here by Sir Stafford Cripps in March 1942, which, paradoxically enough, is both withdrawn and still holds the field, as 'a post-dated cheque.' Another important snag is that the offer of independence after the termination of hostilities is not an unqualified and absolute one but is hamstrung by a number of checks and counter-checks, whether deliberately or unwittingly introduced, to prevent unity of thought and action among Indians and by a number of conditions which require to be preliminarily fulfilled before it can become effective in its implementation. One of the most vital of these conditions is agreement among the diverse interests and communities in India, which will be impossible to achieve in the face of the encouragement to disagreement contained therein.

If one visualizes the picture of India that will emerge after all those conditions are worked out into practical effect, he will find rising before his mind's eye a perfect mosaic of bewildering incoherence, in which India, as we now see it and as it had existed since the

beginning of history, will probably be unrecognizable. If the Cripps scheme is implemented, she will probably be divided into a number of territorial divisions, mutually antagonistic Ulsters in the form of Indian States will arise and communal divergences will exacerbate and the country would become a stranger to political peace. Dominion Status with right of secession was the one saving grace of that scheme; but that section of Indians, who are followers of Mahatma Gandhi—and it is an important and growing section—will not obviously touch Dominion Status, even with the right of secession, with a pair of tongs. Even those in India who believe that India would derive some advantages, economic and military, by hitching her star to the wagon of the British Commonwealth are distressed by the limitations interpolated in the British declaration about India's future. Whether and when this country would be in a position to reap the practical benefits from attaining the status of a dominion in the face of these restrictions and impeding conditions is difficult to divine for there is nothing definite or unambiguous about it. It is sad to contemplate that long before her offer is transformed into a living and practical reality, Britain by her policy is creating that psychological predisposition among large sections of Indians in favour of the exercise of the right of secession implicit therein.

Thus unless immediately requisite measures are taken by the British Government which will convince India that the political, economic and other advantages she is likely to acquire by

remaining within the British Empire structure will not be outweighed by the advantages derivable from secession, the latter contingency is likely to be transformed into an inescapable danger. This makes it imperative that the psychological and political conditions favourable to proneness to secession should be eliminated with the utmost expedition—a thing which the British Government can alone accomplish. Minorities, the services, the Princes and British commercial interests constitute the combination of factors which, in that Government's estimation, oppose limitations on immediate transfer of power to an Indian Government which, they maintain, will be opposed by some of those interests and thus lead to anarchy. The essential reality, however, is that these interests will present insuperable obstacles so long as British policy remains that it is : they will automatically adjust themselves to the different conditions that will supervene if clearcutness invests the Government's attitude towards India. Indian national patriotism, to the extent that it is obsessed by loyalty to sectional or communal interests or by communal intransigence, will dominate over the latter the moment Britain's overlordship is imperilled by a policy of genuine willingness to implement its assurance of freedom, irrespective of the absence of cent per cent internal agreement. Thus the key to India's freedom is in Britain's hands. Immediately the decision to surrender the key is made, Indian parties and communities will inevitably realize the necessity for concerted efforts to get together to safeguard

and protect the house which the key will have opened. The fact is that Britain cannot keep the key tightly within her grip and yet maintain that she is prepared and even anxious to give it up. There will be no incentive to Indian parties to unite and settle things among themselves so long as there is no prospect of their being able to exercise effective control over the country's affairs. The plum of power, on the other hand, when it is within reach, will indeed prove too irresistible an attraction to them to relinquish. British statesmen should realize once for all that their argument about willingness to transfer power remaining unrecognised by Indians' cussedness in not grasping that offer and their not being united in grasping it cuts precious little ice with intelligent Indians.

Let us presume that Mr. Churchill was relying on clause number One of the Atlantic Charter to demonstrate that his denial to India of the application of clause number Three of that document was not inspired by any imperialist motive. For a country like Britain, which possesses a large Empire for herself, to deny any intention of territorial aggrandizement is at best a negative virtue; after all it is impossible for any country fighting Germany and Japan to consider aggrandizement over others' territories as a feasible proposition unless she is prepared to be branded and stigmatized as following exactly the same policy which she has been condemning in others all along. So hateful and abhorrent is the Nazi creed of territorial aggrandizement, so voluminous and vociferous has been

the denunciation thereof that neither Britain nor any of the United Nations for that matter can contemplate doing anything which will smack directly or indirectly of emulating that creed. Clause One of the Atlantic Charter is, therefore, to be regarded as the expression of a pious, if also a generous, wish so far as Britain or the U.S.A. is concerned. On the other hand clause number Three embodies a positive constructive ideal: it embodies the ideal and hope of freedom for the world which principally justifies its being characterized as a Charter for World Freedom. The clause proclaims the desire of the signatories "to respect the rights of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live." The words 'all peoples' occurring here are significant and abundantly clear and do not lend themselves to a variety of interpretations or even two different interpretations such as those which Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt have put upon them. They are capable of one single construction which is that 'all peoples' stands for 'all peoples' and no amount of quibbling can restrict its construction only to the peoples of Europe or America. The value of the two principles of the Charter referred to will be nullified if the British and the American nations put up a barbed wire fence around what they have acquired and are prepared further to recharge it with electric current to enable them to hold on inflexibly to it; and if they do the latter, it will be morally indefensible for them to maintain that they have formulated a set of principles for world reconstruction. The war will have been fought in vain and the long procession of human

sacrifices that one sees passing before him since September 1939 will have lost all its supreme emotional and psychological appeal if that were so. The Atlantic Charter will not be worth the paper it is written on if the signatories had affixed their names to it with so many mental reservations. It is evident, however, that it is not the case and that the Charter was meant to be what its language connotes and conveys.

At the same time the Dominion Status conception is a rapidly changing conception, with no finality as regards the extent of the power transferred to or exercised or exercisable by the self-governing Dominions. With the passing of the Statute of Westminster, they acquired the right of cutting themselves away from Great Britain and while they remain associated with her, the only cementing link between them and Britain is the Crown. The Crown, however, can be an effective link only so long as it is recognized as such by the Dominions, but it cannot be considered an unbreakable link. The present war has served clearly to indicate that dominions like Canada and Australia may regard it as propitious and indispensable to their interests to exercise the right of freedom of action to the extent of aligning themselves intimately with the United States instead of continuing their exclusive dependence on Britain. The stresses and demands of national defence in the present global conflict have demonstrably proved that, while Britain cannot adequately discharge her obligations to the Dominions in that regard, some of them can have those obligations and demands fulfilled better and more effectively by



collaboration with the U.S.A., for instance.

Collaboration in the matter of Defence will necessarily be the precursor to collaboration in the matter of trade, tariffs, economic relations and so on. If Canada and Australia and New Zealand can adopt a policy like this after the war, inevitably a new conception of Dominion Status will have sprung into existence in which the Dominions will be retaining but a nominal connection and association with Britain while developing new connections and associations with other countries. When they can do so, India too will deem it her right to strike a line of her own, while remaining, if possible, a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations and breaking herself away from it if it becomes necessary. Unto that end India should have to prepare herself steadily and unflinchingly from now onwards by making herself self-sufficient and self-supporting in regard to her own defence during the period of the war and by rapid strides creating conditions in which she can stand on her own legs without Britain's help. It is a process which Britain herself cannot impugn in the face of stern facts and realities, the sternest of them being the presence in India at present of large contingents of American and Chinese, besides British troops to ensure her defence against Japanese aggression. Once India attains the same status as other dominions she would, ordinarily speaking, desire to continue her political association with Great Britain unless she is compelled to secede by circumstances unforeseeable at the present moment. But she would also, like Canada or Australia, desire to enter into closer collaboration with the Asiatic

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bloc of countries, without, if possible, detriment to her political association with Great Britain. The conclusion to which the reasoning leads is that with Dominion Status guaranteed and assured unconditionally immediately after the war, Britain would be able to consummate her friendship with India and secure her allegiance to the British Commonwealth, of which prospect Mr. Amery spoke with unalloyed enthusiams in many of his numerous speeches on India. On the other hand, with uncertainty and prevarication as the highlights of Britain's policy the chances in the opposite direction would only aggravate.

### CHAPTER III

#### **Problems of the Minorities**

I am one of those Indians who have not hesitated to maintain that my country should wholeheartedly participate in war effort and co-operate with the United Nations in crushing the Axis Powers. But whenever I say so there rises before me the vision of the bright future of my country—a future in which Indians are free and independent, in which Indians manage their own affairs, Indian interests in all vital matters prevail unquestionably, in which poverty and privation have disappeared from India, education and enlightenment are widespread, in which Indians will not be found grovelling obsequiously before foreigners but will be able to hold their heads proudly aloft and foreigners who now dominate her destinies themselves will have voluntarily abandoned their superior attitude and realized that their place in India is as fellow-citizens with Indians or not at all. It is this vision that stimulates and encourages me to advise my countrymen to assist to the maximum possible extent in the prosecution of the war because without an Allied victory therein, the vision will have no chance of becoming a reality. A similar future visualized for this country by other large numbers of Indians, too, and in this they differ from those among their countrymen who are opposed to co-operation with war effort for one reason or the other and who have set themselves in opposition hereto.

But I must confess at the same time that

immediately there must be something substantial, some worth-while changes which I can clearly and definitely regard as the prelude and harbinger of the bright future that is in store for the country. Part of the anticipation I referred to above should be translatable and interchangeable into concrete reality to energize and sustain the faith that Indians entertain about the glorious place which their country will undoubtedly attain after the war, even according to present calculations. There is absolutely nothing extraordinary or unnatural in this demand for immediate changes as an earnest of the bigger and brighter things to happen after the war. If Britain's offer of freedom to India after the war contained in the Cripps Declaration has been ridiculed by Mahatma Gandhi as a 'post-dated cheque,' the most effective counterblast to this characterization that Britain can think of is to demonstrate that it is a cheque which India is in a position immediately to cash at least in part. Thus alone can the seal of faith, confidence, trust and co-operation be imprinted most authoritatively on India's enthusiastic participation in the war and on permanent, friendly Indo-British relations and co-operation. Thus alone can India be induced to remain a contented and happy and useful member of the British Commonwealth, imparting it strength and vitality and deriving strength and vitality from it in turn. Thus alone can the demand for India for secession from the British Empire, which rightly or wrongly, is a vigorous and live demand, be probably by-passed.

The immediate changes postulated, namely, the transfer of power to an Indian Government

untrammelled by external vetoes and inhibitions, are a necessary prelude to the post-war changes, which will find India not only free internally, but occupying a status of perfect equality at the Peace Conference table and helping in the shaping of world policies. The picture of post-war India which I have visualized can, however, be drawn and drawn completely only if India's political and economic freedom are unconditionally assured and guaranteed now and in a manner in which the War Cabinet's Draft Declaration brought by Sir S. Cripps had failed to do. We have our internal problems—our communal problems, for instance—which we have to tackle decisively and finally but amicably before internal peace and progress can be a reality. Indians are not impervious to the existence of these problems and do not want to burke or minimise them and British politicians like Mr. Churchill and Mr. Amery definitely compromise their reputation for statesmanlike and sympathetic handling of the Indian situation when they attempt to rub in the consideration of their existence as an insurmountable obstacle to the unambiguous declaration of freedom and transfer of power.

Hindu-Muslim differences will be adjusted in a friendly spirit when the breeze of freedom begins to blow over the Indian soil, when alone the adjustment and reconciliation of those differences will be recognized as worth-while and imperative by the disputants. Britishers, however, can assist in the process in a very large measure if they are sincere and earnest in their professions. Their assistance will be warmly welcomed if forth-

coming in an ungrudging and non-patronizing spirit and as a spontaneous recognition of their inherent responsibility in that regard. To our regret, however, that has not been the spirit which has so far actuated British attempts at eliminating the communal canker. It is an entirely unhelpful 'divide and rule' spirit that has actuated them. Let it be agreed that the Communal Award is a monument or signpost of our communal irreconcilability; but it is not also an indication of Britain's solicitousness for Indian unity or progress. It only demonstrated the latter's eagerness to further widen our communal differences and to trade on them for her own political advantage. Mr. Amery as the high priest of this spirit during the last five years, has shown himself a resounding success. His policy and his speeches constitute a clever camouflage for his intention to vouchsafe the minority communal interests a permanent veto over Indian progress and they have been outstanding successes in promoting and stereotyping Muslim League recalcitrance.

It is not as if any Indian nationalist who believe in the great destiny of his country is anxious to deprive the Muslims of any portion of their legitimate rights or to be a party to the suppression of their language or culture or racial individuality. It is a myth which is sedulously cultivated to create arguments favourable to the separation theory and to a particular slogan, namely, Pakistan based on that theory, when Mr. Jinnah and his League colleagues proclaim that under a single central Indian Government, constituted on a democratic basis, the Muslims will be reduced to the

status of perpetual helots and slaves. Nothing is further from the thought of any sane or responsible Hindu than to provide support to Mr. Jinnah's demand by gratuitously disregarding legitimate Muslim political or other demands or to exploit their minority position to their everlasting detriment and disadvantage. Safeguards in a sufficient measure can be provided for the Muslim community as well as for other minority communities, in the constitutional framework, in the moulding of which Muslims will undoubtedly have an effective voice. And as to the adequacy or nature of such safeguards, the Muslims themselves can be the judges at the time of formulating the constitution while disputed points, if necessary, can be referred to international arbitration or settled through some other mutually agreed procedure. All these imperative considerations are so well understood and clearly acknowledged and expressly stated several times by Hindu leaders, both of the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha persuasions, that it is superfluous to repeat them. Gandhiji had gone as far as any Congress leader could go when he accepted the principle of division of India to meet the League demand only to find that Mr. Jinnah would have immediate 16 annas Pakistan or nothing.

But the consideration referred to might be reiterated just to demonstrate that Muslim League apprehensions about Hindu domination are entirely without foundation. I repeat them to demonstrate the unwarrantedness of the demand for the division of India into communal zones or into independent communal states, which in so far as it



means an exhibition of the cloven foot, will only fill British diehards and would-be grabbers of Indian territory with jubilation. I repeat then to show that the argument about the unsuitability and the dangerous implications from the Muslim point of view of a common Central Government for the whole of India holds little or no water. On the other hand a common Central Government is an integral factor and an indispensable desideratum for the preservation of India's integrity and independence in a world pervaded with the spirit of aggression. To any powerful nation intent upon territorial aggrandizement absence of a strong powerful central authority claiming the maximum allegiance and loyalty of all the component elements, will be an invitation to indulge in its cupidity and India's long history affords more than one striking illustration of the validity of this statement. India parcelled out into two or more states will be incapable of resisting such aggression, particularly in view of the prospect of the different states that may be formed being actuated by conflicting communal loyalties.

The fundamental point is that theocratic states are an anachronism in modern times, whatever may have been their justification in the latter Middle Ages. Only those nations are strong and powerful and are capable of raising their heads aloft whose component populations are prepared to substitute the principle of a common loyalty to a common political ideology for the principle of communal or tribal loyalty. No patriotic Indian can contemplate the prospect that division of the country involves with any degree of satisfaction

even as he cannot contemplate with equanimity the substitution of one hegemony over the country by another, the latter of which might be, presumptively, far worse than the former. Much less can he contemplate such division when both Hindus and Muslims are labouring under a common tutelage, the grip of which shows no signs of rising and which will naturally and inevitably attempt to exploit division to maintain its hold. It is not suspicion of British intentions that induces this conclusion. It is realisation of the fact that the instinct of self-preservation will obstruct assertion of any altruistic intentions unless forced by circumstances.

My principal thesis, therefore, is that attainment of freedom will prove an automatic solvent of all India's problems which appear so formidable and forbidding at present. Communities like the Muslims, entities like the Indian States, and interests like the British commercial interests and the Civil Services will realise, once the badening influence of British control is withdrawn, that they have to adjust their view-points to fit into the overpowering and omnipotent factor of Indian national interests. It is an inspiring and ennobling thing to learn and at the same time a wholly gratifying feature of the situation that smaller minority communities like the Indian Christians and the Parsis have on any occasions unequivocally and unhesitatingly proclaimed their loyalty to the ideal of a united and undivided India and resolutely disavowed the claim for special protection and special protectorates, which have been the progenitors of

the separationist tendencies and of the demand for independent states within the larger state of India. The Indian Muslims numbering about ninety millions, though scattered over the country, are a vastly bigger and more numerous community than any of the other minority communities and are in a definitely stronger position to defend their rights against potential encroachment or infringement. I am sure that once the bright star of freedom dawns on the Indian horizon, the fundamental patriotism of the Muslim community and their loyalty to a common motherland will assert themselves and that they will realise, what is a stern and obvious reality even now to all thinking Indians, Hindus and Muslims alike, that the scheme of independent Muslim States in the north-east and north-west of India is politically unnecessary, economically and financially unsound, militarily untenable and from the standpoint of solving the communal problem ineffective. A redistribution of provincial boundaries is indubitably needed as much as a concession to the principle of communal and cultural homogeneity of the provincial units as a matter of administrative necessity when the new constitution for India comes to be devised. But a horizontal division of India as a concession to the clamour for communal states, which may (or may not) eventually turn out to be nothing better than a concession to the principle of extra-territorial loyalty, must be clearly ruled out as an infamous proposal.

I am a Hindu ; I am bred up on the idea and all my education and culture have taught me

that India from immemorial times has been one single geographical unit and has been regarded for centuries as such by every ruler, including the Muslims, who had made this country their home. Breaking his long silence Lord Linlithgow, in December 1942, in the course of his speech to the Associated Chambers of Commerce in Calcutta, stressed this obvious fact, though he did not directly discountenance the Pakistan cry. Similarly Lord Wavell, as Viceroy, stated in his speech to the same body that one cannot ignore geography and nature. To me the scheme that India should be vivisected into a number of communal states, independent of one another, is ununderstandable, inexplicable and abhorrent. But then I know that the same feeling sustains and inspires a very large number of my Muslim countrymen also. I have talked to many of them, and while naturally they feel strongly and vehemently on the point that their political and other rights should be safeguarded, they too cannot appreciate the demand for independent Muslim states, which instead of laying the ghost of the communal problem, which is indubitably our most difficult problem, raises innumerable other complicated issues which can possibly be settled only by resort to extreme remedies like a fratricidal civil war. It should do the hearts of all of us good to recall here the forthright confession of faith in the ideal of a united India by so thoughtful and distinguished a Muslim as Sir Mirza Ismail in his addresses to the Patna and Dacca University Convocations in 1942. "To me India, one nation, is a most inspiring thought and a most reasonable

one," he maintained in his Patna address, while at Dacca he illustrated the geographical indivisibility of the country by emphasising the fact that provincial boundaries do not prove barriers to close inter-provincial contacts and interdependence. He reiterated his view at the recent Aligarh University address also and in his address to the Indian Political Science Conference held in Jaipur in December 1944. I may also recall here the characterisation by another thoughtful Muslim, Nawab Yar Jung Bahadur, Finance Minister of Hyderabad, of the Pakistan theory as "absurd." The fact is that political and communal and regional peace in India will be completely destroyed for some decades at least and internecine strife will be substituted for internal good-will and friendship by endeavours at an artificial dismemberment of the geographical, political and cultural factors perennially and consistently making for the country's unity and strength.

Then again when Mr. Jinnah claims that Pakistan is the justest solution for our communal problems he is merely begging the question. There are and must be a number of other methods in which the problem can much more satisfactorily be resolved than by insisting on a remedy which is calculated to engender furious strife before it can be accomplished and which is calculated to perpetuate that strife in an intensified form if ever it is accomplished. British administrators and British policy in India for nearly a century and a half strove incessantly for India's unity and I consider it as one of the precious heritages of British rule,

which it has bequeathed to India. It, therefore, distresses me in the extreme when a Secretary of State like Mr. Amery speaks in Mr. Jinnah's voice and non-chalantly proclaims the infamous doctrine that Britain would rather see divided and free than that she would keep her various elements chafing against Britain. He had in that one sentence repudiated a hundred and fifty years of indefatigable British effort in this country in an attempt to adopt the line of least resistance and prevented India from advancing to her destiny by surrendering to an extreme communal demand. The unity of India or India united and free is an unalterable article of faith with every true Indian nationalist, Hindu or Muslim. India divided and which Mr. Jinnah and the League demand and free which Mr. Amery apparently prefers, is, on the other hand, a contradiction in terms; a paradoxical statement which is pregnant with the element of impracticability. It remains to be seen now how far Lord Linlithgow's and Lord Wavell's assertions about India's geographical and natural unity will be effective in neutralising the effect of Mr. Amery's defeatist statement. I repeat my apprehension that India divided cannot be free for long; it is the disruptionist's panacea which inheres its own refutation. In any case Mr. Jinnah and his friends cannot maintain in one breath that Islam is a great democratic religion, which it is in fact, and in another propound and propagate the un-Islamic idea that democracy is unsuited to this country and that Muslims cannot consent to a common government, in which they will play and are bound to play a not inconspicuous or insignificant role.

Among the untried solutions of the communal problem in India we have the scheme of joint electorates, which are calculated not only to foster a feeling of common citizenship, cutting across communal and religious affiliations, but also to promote a sense of common national patriotism. The swing-back to joint electorates will entail the country's living down of the last thirty-eight years of her history, during which Muslim separatism has been studiously and consistently encouraged by a series of concessions to the principle of separate electorates and special treatment of minorities and so on. That it has proved a veritable Frankenstein monster is evident from the recent vociferous claim for separate electorates and for the burying of the Poona Pact written in the ink of sacrifice and suffering of a noble saint like Mahatma Gandhi advanced by Dr. Ambedkar on behalf of the scheduled castes.

Nevertheless reintroduction of joint electorates is an effort worth making by all Indian nationalists. If it is a reform, the difficulties besetting the path of resurrecting which are worth facing and eliminating. If, however, it is found to be an impossible proposition, other alternatives will have to be tried. One of these is the substitution of a suitable form of representative Government in place of the scheme of responsible Government, which is regarded as the ideal form of Government under which alone democracy will flourish. The sentimental attachment we all possess for the responsible system will have to be re-examined in the light of the peculiar nature of the Indian problem and we may have to make compromises,

here and if found necessary. So long as a genuine spirit of democracy, in the sense that all governments must ultimately derive their inspiration, strength and power from the governed and depend on the consent of the latter is not sacrificed and its outward form of responsible government is not haggled to, so long as national freedom is guaranteed and ensured, so long as India's unity is preserved and disintegrating tendencies are neutralised and suppressed, compromises on details need not be considered calamitous. Let us be perfectly clear on the point that the supreme need is the maintenance of Indian integrity combined with effective protection of the rights of every community. If we are clear on that, it follows that while compromise and adjustment are necessary, it is impossible to give to the demand that for the preservation of unity we should first of all acquiesce in the principle of division and dismemberment of India. It is a paradox which is difficult to comprehend and is on a par with the paradox which was lately current in international circles in the war years—that for the preservation of peace nations must be heavily armed. The armament which that plea gave rise to led inexorably to war and did not succeed in preserving the peace. Exactly in the same way, the disruption of Indian unity by establishing a number of independent states within the country is inherent with the danger of further disruption just as the separate states principle introduced as a stop-gap arrangement under the Minto-Morley reforms led to accentuated demand for separation and



further separation, culminating in the Pakistan demand. The need, therefore, is undeviatingly to adhere to fundamental principles, leaving the door open for adjustments in details. That is essential and inescapable in politics.

With regard to the responsible Government principle itself, it is imperative to remember that even in Great Britain during the period of stress represented by the war, an actual breakdown in the parliamentary system was avoided only through the Englishman's well-known capacity for political compromise which made him realise that the executive should be a composite one and that it should be left with as large a measure of initiative as possible consistent only with its obligations to the electorates represented in Parliament.

An All-India Federation, which will include within its embrace the British Indian provinces as well as Indian States and which will provide for a common Central Government to discharge essential common functions, therefore, obviously the most appropriate form of constitution for a country like India. Within the framework of the all-India constitutional structure adjustments can be made which will safeguard all legitimate and reasonable demands of all interests and parties. It should be possible, if negotiations are carried on on the plane of realities and with a view to discover solutions to the differences between the various communities and interests, to find out such solutions which will avoid the pitfalls of the League demand for self-determination. With India's unity safeguarded, rival communal and

other claims can be provided for, whereas with these claims pressed to the point of disruption, India as such will surely disappear and the country become a perpetual arena for the play of centrifugal forces constantly endangering her security and independence. Unity in diversity has been India's foremost contribution to world's philosophical thought ; let us not lightly abandon that heritage in pursuit of the strange dogma of diversity as a prelude to unity. On the other hand freedom and democracy are India's most indubitable requisites. With freedom assured, the details of the methods of enjoying that freedom and the division of power among the various interests thereunder will be worked out by negotiation and discussion among Indians as a matter of inescapable necessity. Democracy as a mode of living is not a strange thing for India, and if departure from the structure of democratic institutions in the West is essential to suit indigenous conditions, Indian genius will supply the remedies herefor.

#### CHAPTER IV

### **Civil Services, British Interests and Princes**

Next to the communal problem we have the problem of British commercial interests and of the civil services, the latter of which in particular may choose to play the rôle of last ditchers in the matter of interposing impediments to the realisation of India's political aspirations. The civil services do not always come out into the open. They constitute, however, the power working from behind the screen, the invisible arguments behind the steely reactionarism of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Amery. They sustain the latter and are in turn sustained by them. So far as India's progress towards self-government and freedom is concerned, they are likely to play the part of the last refuge of diehardism. The most closely knit official corporation in the world, the members of the Indian Civil Service constitute a caste by themselves whose faith is inflexibly pinned on big emoluments, unconscionable privileges, entrenchment of routine and silent obstruction to progressive reform. If self-government in India has made some strides in the past, it is largely in spite of the civil services, while they are adepts in defeating in its details what has been accepted and endorsed in principle. In the Secretary of State, to whom alone they owe any genuine allegiance, they have a tower of strength, a loyal and steadfast supporter of their cause and an instrument for the fulfilment of

their demands and their favourite theories in regard to administrative policies.

Keeping themselves within the shadow of that functionary's protecting wings, the civil services have successfully stared the popular ministries in the Indian provinces in the face and nullified the ends and purposes of liberal measures of legislation by illiberal administration of reliefs provided hereby. The fact that some of the Congress ministers showered encomia on the loyalty and good work of the civil servants does not detract from the essential correctness of the diagnosis made above. It is true also that there is a proportion of members of the civil service who regard that they owe a greater loyalty to the country they serve but it does not detract from the greater loyalty a larger proportion owe to an outside authority. To the services, therefore, the continuance of the *status quo* in India or in the alternative as insignificant modifications in the present administrative system as possible is a consummation devoutly to be wished for. The Government of India Act of 1935 is a constitutional instrument which, from the Indian nationalist standpoint, is a mosaic of special powers and reservations of essential authority as safeguards for this, that and the other interest. Among the safeguards incorporated therein, the most comprehensive and the most deleterious from the point of view of India's self-government, are those for safeguarding the position and prospects of the services. And while they afford protection to the existing rights of the latter, they restrict to the same extent the effec-

tive control which popular ministers and legislatures can exercise over them.

Let it be stated here clearly and definitely that among responsible sections of public opinion in India there is ample willingness to guarantee the rights and emoluments of the existing members of the Imperial services. What they cannot agree to, however, is that the Indian legislature's right to alter these rights to the country's advantage in future should be severely restricted and that essential modifications in the methods of recruitment or conditions of service should wait till the members of the services are prepared voluntarily to shed their privileged position and status. In a free India, recruitment to the I.C.S. and I.P.S. in England must cease and not only will these services be manned more or less exclusively by Indians but they will have cheerfully to reconcile themselves to the prospect of an indigenous Government's supervision and control. I am sure that there will never be a dearth of sufficient number of Indians of the requisite calibre who will be prepared to shoulder the responsibility for the country's administration on emoluments which will bear a better and closer approximation to the economic condition of India than what is the case now.

Similarly, to the British commercial interests, India will be prepared to concede their existing position, subject only to the very pertinent and very reasonable condition that that concession does not cut across the rights and the promotion of Indian commercial interests. For them to expect or demand special or privileged treatment in a

free India which will be prejudicial to Indian national interests or will involve the sacrifice of the latter would be to expect the inconceivable. There is a limit to a country's, as to an individual's, altruism and in the case of India that limit has been reached so far as accommodating British commercial interests is concerned. To the extent that the latter desire to function in India and co-operate with Indians in building up their country's economic and industrial future their co-operation will be welcome. Indeed it is possible that India will require the aid of British capital and the assistance of technical personnel in building up her own economic and industrial structure ; but that will be on India's own terms and not *vice versa*. It follows from this that British interests will have to accept the inevitability of the need for their throwing in their lot with Indians and collaborating with them on terms of equality. And if they can by their attitude and conduct ensure for themselves a secure place in the country's heart, by providing demonstrable evidence of their goodwill towards this country, it will be mutually advantageous and profitable. It will indeed be a permanent factor in promoting the economic stability and self-sufficiency of the British Commonwealth in the post-war world. India eagerly awaits the British Government's decision regarding the repayment of India's sterling balances, and on that decision will largely depend the prospects of friendly Indo-British collaboration in the economic and commercial sphere. The Bretton Woods Conference conclusions are not exactly a reflex of Britain's

financial and economic altruism towards India.

Lastly we have the complicated problem of the Indian Princes to settle if Indian unity and political stability are to be permanently ensured. Let us acknowledge the basic consideration that in the scheme of an all-India Federation, of which a common Central Government for the whole country is an integral need, the Princes must find a place and cannot be ignored. A first class difficulty is, however, likely to be encountered in reconciling the imperative requirements of a free and democratic constitution with the treaty rights and *sanads* by which the Princes' relations with the Paramount Power are determined and on the recognition and guaranteeing of which the Princes are insistent. The latter's case in relation to Indian freedom was presented in a brief but comprehensive compass by H. H. the Jam Sahib of Nawanagar in an address before the East India Association of London on December 3, 1942, when the speaker declared that "basically our demands have always been the same: first, the maintenance of the treaty rights under the aegis of the Crown, and secondly, effective and sufficient safeguards." The Jam Sahib agreed that "we have at least the same ideal as other patriotic Indians of a united India, but we equally well hold that we, as Princes, have an historical and individual contribution to make to it just as the other great elements in the political picture." The Congress agitation, between 1937 and 1939, in the various States designed to encourage the demand for self-government by the States' subjects, accompanied in certain cases by resort to civil

disobedience to enforce that demand, had stiffened the attitude of the Princes towards Federation which they enthusiastically endorsed at the first Round Table Conference and induced them to reject it in the form embodied in the 1935 Constitution Act. Subsequently, the clause in the War Cabinet's Draft Declaration brought by Mr. Stafford Cripps which stated that "whether or not an Indian State elects to adhere to the constitution, it will be necessary to negotiate provision of its treaty arrangements so far as this may be required by the new situation," had enforced their hesitation by aggravating their fears and doubts and had made them extremely cautious and guarded as to their attitude. The Princes' apprehensions must be taken note of in as far as their claims for safeguards must be respected to the extent possible.

There is no gainsaying the fact that Indian India has a contribution to make to the future Indian constitution and that some of the States are repositories of Indian traditions and culture in a more distinctive sense than the territories included in British India. The wholesale abolition of the Indian States is, therefore, an unthinkable proposition. But equally unthinkable is the proposition that the States' administrations can remain perpetually in the position of benevolent regenerate autocracies and that States' subjects can be constrained to remain non-participants in the governance of their own affairs. The Princes cannot undeviatingly adhere to their treaty obligations and *sansads* in their original form and be to accept reasonable and necessary modifica-



ations and alterations in them to suit the demands of the changing times. On this point they are themselves not irrationally adamant. They are willing to accept essential changes; in fact from time to time changes and alterations in the Paramount Power-Princes' relations had taken place either through interpretation of treaties by the Political Department or by usage or otherwise and they are at present in a state of flux, the ultimate outcome of which is indeterminable.

Unsustainable also is the indictment that the Princes are impervious to the need for introducing constitutional reforms within their respective States, which are intended, in varying degrees, to associate their subjects with the government. Mysore, Baroda, Kashmere, Travancore, Cochin, Gwalior, Dewas Senior and Junior, are among some of the States which have representative Legislative Assemblies functioning within their territories for a number of years. Hyderabad, the biggest Indian State, has fallen in line already with a scheme of constitutional reform implemented recently, and Jaipur is also rapidly doing so while there are other States like Bikaner where similar endeavours are being made to introduce administrative and legislative reforms of a liberal and progressive nature. The reform movement can definitely be more rapid in the case of some and the actual reforms themselves more liberal in the case of other States. Nevertheless the trend of events is in itself unmistakable and constitutes a favourable augury for British and Indian India's healthy and purposeful co-operation in the future. If everything goes well it

ossible to regard the States as potential supporters of an all-India Federation, in spite of that has happened and which had resulted in the Federal part of the 1935 Act being kept in abeyance, when the time comes for making a decision.

Those States which have remained indifferent far to the claims and demands for progressive forms will also indubitably find it exceedingly difficult to resist the time spirit, even if they may be inclined to such resistance. With British India enjoying freedom and the benefits and advantages of democratic institutions, the Princes stily, cannot indefinitely refrain from throwing their lot with an all-India Federation ; and secondly, they cannot stem the tide of freedom as overstepping territorial boundaries and compelling them to accept larger and bigger changes. Ideas and thought-currents cannot be obstructed from jumping over frontiers, and even where the frontiers are those of independent nations, they have a natural tendency to penetrate through them. In the case of India, of which the States form geographically integral units, the impediments will be still less potent. Ulsterism as a policy of isolation will be an impossible and practicable one for the States to adopt. The fundamental and vital mistake of Congress policy *vis-à-vis* the States has been that Congress showed itself anxious to force the pace of reform which revealed that it did not accord adequate recognition to the potentiality of the time-factor to enforce changes, which excessive outside pressure might be capable of accomplishing. Meanwhile constitu-

tional agitation within the States should continue either as a corrective to the Princes' reactionarism or as an inducement to further and larger changes where changes have already been promulgated.

It may be asserted on the whole that the vast majority of the Princes will not be insuperable impediments either to the unity or the freedom of India. Their patriotism is unquestionable, and historical accident and tradition are factors to which they are professedly attached and therein their wishes and views should be respected. Even if all the States do not come into a self-governing all-India Federation immediately, it is constituted, they are bound to come in later, when they perceive that there are definite and undoubted advantages in doing so which they cannot forego particularly in the matter of defence and other common services. Suitable provisions can be incorporated in the future constitution to facilitate their doing so when they choose to. It is not beyond the range of probability that the Paramount Power, to whom they now look for protection against reformist agitation and are prone to look up to for guidance, will itself have to agree that the protection that it can vouchsafe to them will become progressively insignificant, unless of course it is prepared to countenance the contingency of engaging itself in continuous conflict with the Government of a free India over Princes' rights and treaties. That will be an untenable and unworkable arrangement and the Princes will discover that duality in their allegiance will not work even as the Paramount Power will find that its functions cannot be exercised in a

dyarchic capacity partly as Paramount Power and partly as a government responsible to the Indian Legislature. But I am sure, the Princes' patriotism and statesmanlike instinct will assert themselves long before any of these contingencies arise and they are likely to abandon their dependence on what may prove to be a broken reed. Let us take it that when His Highness the Jam Sahib declared that the aim of the Princes was the preservation of India's unity, a view in which he is supported by other Princes like the Maharaja of Bikaner and States' Ministers like Sir C. P. Ramaswamy Iyer and that they are prepared to move with the times, it was a declaration of policy by him on behalf of his brother rulers in the representative capacity he then possessed as the Chancellor of the Princes' Chamber.

In conclusion the very important point needs emphasis that freedom from want, one of the late President Roosevelt's now famous Four Freedoms, India's greatest and most pressing need. Political freedom that Indians aspire for is not an end in itself, it is mainly a means to the procurement of economic freedom, which in her present political state she has inconspicuously little. Political freedom is fundamental to India because it accords an Indian Government freedom in the formulation of economic, industrial and fiscal policies in the interests solely of the Indian population, cause it alone facilitates their formulating adequate, large-scale measures on a planned basis for the banishment of poverty, low standards of living, disease, filth and dirt from the land and enables India to develop into a strong and healthy

nation. When we are able to shed the shackles of our political dependence, we, as a nation, will undoubtedly achieve spiritual satisfaction. But we can attain physical and mental satisfaction only when poverty and want, which stalk the land and strike any foreigner coming to this country straight in the eye are banished therefrom. It is a regrettable and miserable confession to make, but it is a fact that this country is a striking example of a continuously present paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty, which Europe and other Western nations experience only at exceptional periods of intense depression. Her vast agricultural economy can produce enough food to sustain her population, even though it is unfortunately growing at an alarming pace in recent decades. But for any country to enjoy the fruits of real wealth and real prosperity, it is indispensable in this age not only that the balance between her agricultural and industrial economies must be evenly struck but that both her industrial and agricultural developments should take the fullest advantage of the scientific and technical improvements that have taken place in recent years. It is unfortunate that so far comparatively little effort has been made to apply modern scientific research to Indian agriculture so as to increase the yield of agricultural produce and to make two blades of grass grow where only one was growing before. It is unfortunate too that Indian industrialization has been the painfully, almost exasperatingly, slow process it has been. British altruism towards Indian industrialization stops short at enabling it to attain only to such degree of

development as will not interfere with the interests of British industries themselves and India's tariff policies, notwithstanding the fiscal autonomy which she is supposed to enjoy, have invariably been influenced, if not actually shaped, by the India Office and the Secretary of State with the latter's natural preference to British interests.

Political freedom is, therefore, the *sine qua non* of economic freedom and is the one method by which the present subordination of India's welfare to Britain's standpoint can be avoided. It is an enlightened self-interest on the part of Britain that permits this principle of subordination to be woven into her policy towards India's industrial development; and it provides a most telling explanation of India's present incredible poverty as well as the justification for the relaxation of Britain's grip on this country's affairs. It is a demand the inherent justification for which should have fully impressed itself on British Government circles by now; for an India industrially advanced would have played a more outstanding part as an ally for the Allies, while in actual fact she has now to depend for necessary supplies of equipment and armaments upon the United States and other countries and thereby compelled to limit the capacity for expansion of her fighting forces. The Grady Mission's report constitutes not only a sad commentary on the vast but wasted opportunities

India's industrialization but also an indication of the immense potentialities but she possesses which could have been canalised into purposeful and advantageous channels. The Grady Mission's schemes and suggestions cannot of course

be implemented—in fact, many of them have been shelved—owing to war-time exigencies. They are perhaps, far in advance of the ideas and scheme of the Government of India's extremely slow moving and routine-laden machinery that the latter could not possibly catch up with them. India's war-time prosperity is consequently of a very insignificant nature compared with the industrial boom which prevails in the United States and Britain. But whatever may have happened in the past, India will not tolerate the continuance of present conditions any longer after the war. Her economic, tariff and industrial policies must be formulated and administered by her own people in their own interests, and she must be in a position to ensure that the masses of her population are safeguarded in their enjoyment of the Freedom from Want, which is their most imperative desideratum. Post-War Reconstruction plans in plenty are now holding the field, and it is gratifying that we have at least theoretical acknowledgment of the imperativeness of change, development and reconstruction. A period of social upheaval is the best period for inducing an appreciation of the need for stabilising social security and the plans that are being formulated require co-ordination by a national Government.

## CHAPTER V

### **America and India's Freedom**

In the determination of the structure of the post-war world and in the formulation of policies which will constitute the foundation of that structure and its functioning, the United States of America will undoubtedly play a major—I will even say the principal and foremost—part. Alike by her unique position among the United Nations and by the ideals and the view-points by which her policy was inspired prior to her becoming an active belligerent in December 1941, alike by the fact that she is recognized to be and occupies a front-rank position as the 'Arsenal of the Democracies' and by the fact that her national leaders, irrespective of political denominations, acknowledge in an unstinted and forthright manner the need for holding aloft the banner of democracy, freedom and human personality, the United States has established itself as the undisputed leader of the United Nations. Mr. Churchill made a clean and clear acknowledgment of this position when he declared at the time of the planning and execution of the North African Expedition, that President Roosevelt was the chief agent and leader and himself his ardent and enthusiastic lieutenant. The relations between the United States of America and Britain have not recently been very smooth and cordial, at least in other spheres than the military one, and constant trans-Atlantic verbal



sniping indicates a deterioration in cordiality which might become more marked after the war. The United States has, however, given abundant proof during the last few years that the faith and spirit of Washington, Jafferson and Abraham Lincoln still shines undimmed in the land of the Statue of Liberty and that the statue itself instead of being merely a work of stone, symbolizes a solid, concrete ennobling ideal—the ideal of human liberty, which no dictator or tyrant can efface.

It is in view of these considerations that India looks to America for an unqualified appreciation of her view-point, her demand for freedom and her national aspirations. It is in view of them too that the British Government are so extremely anxious to cultivate American opinion and secure American approbation to their policy in India. An irresistible conclusion to be drawn from the unceasing and uninterrupted flow of British propaganda into the United States in connection with India is that Britain's conscience is not immune from qualms on that score. American doubts and interrogations about India are becoming more and more insistent. The late Mr. Willkie's pointed references to the questionings he heard in the East about America's attitude to Indian freedom did upset the equilibrium of the British statesmen and Mr. Churchill's assertion about Britain holding on to what she has to be regarded as being directly provoked by Mr. Willkie's statement referred to.

To censure and castigate Mr. Willkie or other Americans like Mr. Phillips for making the statements about India which they did, as some Britishers do and as some backwoodsmen among

Americans themselves are doing is, however, really to emphasise and give point to the argument that "by our silence on India we have already drawn heavily on our reservoir of goodwill in the East." Mr. Willkie was perfectly right and justified in saying that India's is the one question that confronted him and that perpetually rose like a phoenix before him from Cairo to Chungking, from the land of the phoenix to the land of Confucius the Wise. "India is our problem," asserted Mr. Willkie; "the Indian problem is the United Nations' problem," declared Mr. Phillips. Indians wholeheartedly concur and feel that the need for India's freedom should be recognised by the wise men of the West as it is by the wise men of the East, as the principal, fundamental part of the United Nations' strategy for winning the war. Clever military strategy is of course the first essential factor in that process; but military strategy must be effectively combined with far-sighted political strategy on the part of Britain and the United States to make the winning of the war, especially in the Far East, doubly certain and sure. In connection with the latter an immediate and successful tackling of the Indian problem should be accorded a conspicuous place. For, the moment that problem is tackled and settled, a huge reservoir not only of goodwill but assistance in the form of overflow of men and materials which will swamp the totalitarian forces and ensure rapid victory for the Allies will have been opened. And more than the winning of the war it will facilitate in an abundant measure the winning of the peace. India assured of the essential ingredi-

ents of freedom now will amount practically to winning half the peace and in advance, while India completely free will be potentially a powerful factor after the war in building up the peace structure on foundations which will ensure its permanence and impart to it essential strength and enduring vitality in an overwhelming measure.

But it is essential that in the United States the realization of these supreme considerations should intensify. At present there is a tremendous volume of propaganda in that country conducted on behalf of the British Government compared to which the presentation of India's case in the correct perspective and from the nationalist Indian view-point amounts to but a feeble endeavour. By India's case, I mean what the words actually convey and not her case from any particular political angle like the Congress or the League angle. Mr. Louis Fischer, Mr. Edgar Snow, Mr. Drew Pearson, Miss. Pearl Buck among others, and apart from Indians interested in India's freedom have been energetically putting forward facts and emphasizing realities. But we require more men of this type, from among the Americans themselves, who will state India's case and state it with restraint and dignity and impartiality. Nationalist India does not want her view-point to be distorted by either overstatement or understatement. There is no need to resort to exaggerations and to paint the picture in lurid colours even as there is no useful purpose served by interested persons putting it in an inconspicuously low key. After all the point should not be lost sight of that India's anxiety is not gratuitously to lower Britain

in the world's estimation or to gain a mere argumentative advantage over her but solely to attain her legitimate national aspirations. She only wants Britain to play fair towards her, to assure her the same freedom as she has assured other down-trodden nations of Europe, to quicken the pace of the fulfilment of her own declarations and more than all to accomplish something immediately in the direction of entrusting Indians with real authority in the direction of their affairs which will provide an unerring indication of her good intentions towards India. She, in brief, expects Britain to act in such a way that the British Empire will in fact be transformed into a Commonwealth of Nations in which India will occupy as honoured and as significant a role as either Australia or Canada or South Africa, both when the war is on and when the peace structure is to be evolved.

The one outstanding question, therefore, is where does America stand in this matter? How far are the American Government and American President prepared to go in impressing on their coadjutor country and her Government across the Atlantic that they should tackle the Indian problem in right earnest now and here and break the deadlock which has rendered India so utterly distraught at a time of world conflict. President Roosevelt did not make any direct reference to India in any of his speeches. Officially the Government of the United States have not also said anything on the question of this country. There may be well founded and easily explicable reasons for that attitude of reticence. Nevertheless, there are indications that India is not

absent from their minds ; at least it cannot be after the unambiguous and forthright report made to President Roosevelt by his personal representative and that they take full cognizance of all that is being said and written about her in the American and the British press. I can understand and appreciate the difficulty in the Administration openly making any pronouncement about the affairs of a country which is politically subordinate to an important Allied country, whom they cannot afford to displease, and into whose affairs they would not poke their noses if they could avoid it. But there are ways and methods other than an open and public expression of opinion in which a Government occupying the unique and significant position which the U.S.A. Government occupy *vis-a-vis* the Allied nations, can make their standpoint explicit to the Governments of those countries with whom they are on terms of intimate friendship. Are they utilizing any of these avenues for making the British Government and particularly Mr. Churchill appreciate the necessity of settling the Indian difficulty ? This can be ascertained only from some actual happenings, some concrete steps and measures that Britain has taken or will take in dealing with the Indian issue. So far any such concrete measures are conspicuous by their absence which means that Britain is having a free hand in the matter. The only hope is that public opinion in the United States will be incessantly vigilant in the assertion of its independent judgment about India so that it will become irresistible and unignorable, so that it

against interested British propaganda to justify their policy of 'nothing doing' or of magnifying the communal disagreement to sit tight on the issue. Truth and facts and the imperative demands of war-time will assert themselves, so that it would be possible for the U.S.A., both her people and her Government, clearly to perceive the wood and not be deceived by the trees.

Let the U.S.A., her Government, and people, in considering the Indian standpoint and in deciding what should be their own attitude *vis-a-vis* that standpoint, constantly bear in mind the objectives for which and the circumstances in which they have been forced into the war. For more than two years, between 1939 and 1941, the U.S.A., was an interested looker-on while Europe was fighting her battles against the Teutonic hordes, while France collapsed and the *blitzkrieg* against Britain was at its fiercest, while the Germans deliberately attacked Russia and involved themselves in an inextricable mess, which has clearly proved to be the beginning of their ultimate and unconditional collapse. American opinion was overwhelmingly isolationist; the Munroe Doctrine was eagerly hugged to as the last refuge of a people immensely reluctant to enter directly into the conflict but perpetually apprehending Axis subversive designs within their own territories and on the American Continent; and her administration was eagerly searching for a *via media* between direct intervention, extension of help to democracies and continued isolationism. Between July 1940 and the disaster at Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941, President Roosevelt's utterances revealed a firm and undeviating adherence to de-

democratic ideals and an intense horror of totalitarianism, the hard and constant struggle he had to put up to prevent isolationism from gaining ascendancy, to educate public opinion about the immense onrushing danger of an Axis attack upon America's integrity and prepare the ground for the eventuality in which the United States might find herself directly involved in the war but all the time making the supremest endeavour to keep the democratic forces well supplied with the sinews of war under the now well-known scheme of "Lend Lease". Underneath all the concrete measures taken by President Roosevelt and supplying the most dynamic motive force was a flaming trust and confidence in the democratic way of life, in democracy itself and in the power and the efficacy of democracy to survive. "In the face of the great perils never before encountered, our strong purpose is to protect and to perpetuate the integrity of democracy," he declared in his speech on January 20, 1940, on the occasion of his inauguration as President for the third term. "For this we must muster the spirit of America and the faith of America. We do not retreat. We are not content to stand still." Similar sentiments were expressed by Mr. Roosevelt oftentimes subsequently.

Things moved rapidly after Japan's declaration of war and her treacherous blow against the unwary American fleet at Pearl Harbour. American isolationism found itself isolated almost overnight and the United States became as directly, completely and deeply involved in war as either Britain or Russia. Her responsibility was now twofold: not only had she to feed the democ-

ratic war machine in three continents as she had been doing even previously but keep her own armies, navies and air forces fully and continuously supplied with machinery and equipment. The destruction of the Axis forces, their complete annihilation became not only an ideal to be promoted by rendering assistance to others but an objective to be directly and adequately and indefatigably pursued by herself through the sacrifice of her own manhood. It is a colossal task; but she prepared herself to undertake it not only in a spirit of service to others but as a fundamental factor in her own survival and self-preservation.

This is the immediate and all-engrossing task before the U.S.A., the central objective and purpose of her endeavours. But placed in the position that she is, she has at the same time to concern herself with the equally or perhaps more important, though somewhat more remote, objective, namely, the formulation of the principles and the planning of the new world order in which the Four Freedoms which President Roosevelt enunciated and which have since constituted the basic underlying principles of America's post-war policy and aims can be realized to the maximum possible extent. Freedom from Want, Freedom from Fear, Freedom from Exploitation and Freedom of Worship—they are noble conceptions all and immensely inspiring as ideals for which man will dare fight and die or, more correctly, fight to live for and enjoy. Whether the Atlantic Charter exists or not as a concrete document duly signed, these principles which are based on the proclaimed clauses of that charter will not lose their validity for humanity



aspiring for peace and real progress.

If these aims and aspirations are to be fulfilled and the Four Freedoms established throughout the world as the bases of a World Charter of Freedom, the United States will have inescapably to accept the implications of the statement of Mr. Willkie that to win the peace three things seem necessary: "First, we must plan for peace on a global basis; second, the world must be free economically and politically, for nations and for man, that peace may exist in it; thirdly, that America must play an active, constructive part in freeing it and keeping the peace." It is necessary to reckon with the possibility that not all these aims and ideals can be attained unreservedly and completely in the near future in this essentially imperfect and un-ideal world. It is probable that disappointments and failures will block the path of the reformer and render achievement incommensurate with aspiration and endeavour incommensurate with idealism. What happened after the 1914—18 Great War is a stern and painful reminder to us of this grave and inherent danger. Nevertheless if even partial success in these directions, the end of which is a better world than the one in which we live now, is to be attained, the aspiration must be clear-cut, the ideal inspiring and the endeavour resolute and unwavering. The United States admittedly failed to rise up to expectations at the end of the last war mainly because she went into it less for the achievement of any specific high aim or objective or in pursuit of a great cause which could inspire men, but more as the result of a passing phase of revenge for some 'inhuman' acts perpetrated by

Germany. More correctly speaking, she drifted into it almost unawares, partly rushed off her feet by propaganda and partly out of indignation at Germany's brutalities. When victory was gained she retired—perhaps over-precipitately—into her isolationist shell. She repudiated her own President and his commitments and plans in pursuance of the illusion that thereby she could keep herself perpetually aloof from what were designated as 'European entanglements.' President Wilson returned to his country to confront a hostile Congress which overturned his League of Nations apple-cart and voted in favour of U.S.A.'s non-participation in the functioning of that body and in the moulding of its fortunes.

The League had proved a regrettable failure for other reasons too, besides American non-co-operation, but that is at least one of the principal reasons that contributed to the debacle that overtook it. In any case, it did not fail because of anything notably deficient in the ideals which inspired those who conceived and founded it, which would justify the conclusion that it involved a reflection on the ennobling character of those basic ideals. It failed to a very large extent because the bigger European nations, which should have regarded themselves as the guardians and watchdogs of its success, utilized its machinery and its prestige for the fulfilment of their selfish national ends and conveniently gave the go-by to the fundamental principles which it was intended to subserve and promote. From 1934 to 1939, the history of the League is a history of the progressive departure of its member-States from the ideals of maintaining

collective security and prevention of aggression, of which Manchuria, Abyssinia, Finland, and Austria and Czechoslovakia provide distressing examples. It rests on the United States, in co-operation with other Allied nations, to assume after the war the lead in the revivification of the League, or in building up the security organisation envisaged in the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement, so that instead of its deteriorating into a mere tombstone for high ideals, it will energize itself into an efficient instrument for the realization of international peace, for the preservation of collective security and for the prevention of unprovoked aggression and totalitarian wars. If a real, international mind, emancipated from the pre-war notions of domination of one country over the other, of the victors wreaking vengeance on the vanquished and thus engendering a spirit of counter-vengeance in the latter and free, too, from a disposition to intensive and violent competitive nationalism on the part of the different countries now engaged in a deadly conflict with the debased nationalism of the Axis countries, comes to prevail among the peoples and the Governments of the United Nations, that alone can be the most effective guarantee for the success of the League. As General Smuts pointed out, the conception of the United Nations that has developed in response to the stress of war conditions and to which more than thirty-five countries have so far subscribed, is a happy augury in that it provides a secure and solid foundation for future co-operation in furtherance of the ideals of the world security organisation. The international mind postulated should be

regarded as an essential prelude to international action to maintain world peace and a guarantee against the repetition of world-shocking armageddons. Would-be aggressors in the future should find in an international air force organized under the auspices of the world organisation a weapon of offence whose striking power they would find irresistible. Let us hope too, in spite of experience and indications pointing to a somewhat contrary conclusion, that the close collaboration among the United Nations that exists at present, will continue uninterrupted after the war, and will be a factor in the evolution in course of time of a World Federal Union, about which so much is being said and written, particularly in the United States herself, now-a-days. A World Union of this kind is likely to remain an idealist's unrealizable dream immediately after the war or at least it will be so so long as nationalism remains a vigorous and vibrant political force. But not in the least impracticable is close international co-operation to attain certain specific objectives in the interests of the whole of humanity and for the preservation of certain fundamental ideals such as world peace and freedom and international justice. And it should not be impracticable mainly because it does not, as at present conceived, cut across or aim at a root and branch extinction of national boundaries or national ideals but recognizes national divergences of a healthy character.

That the United States' part in leading the world along the path of these high aims will be a great and notable one appears to be inherent in her present position and a part of her future des-

tiny. That role she will, however, be able to play by not shirking stark, unignorable realities as she did in 1919, which created a blot on her moral escutcheon, but by appreciating and facing them with all the courage, determination and statesmanship that she can muster and that actually inspire President Roosevelt's (and recently President Truman's) periodic utterances. India will be an interested spectator of the manner in which and the degree to which President Truman, who has become now the Chief Executive of the U.S.A., will discharge that colossal responsibility. One of the outstanding ways in which he can do so will be by setting his seal of approval on the considered opinion of many enlightened publicists and sections of opinion in that country that India is a United States' problem and that its immediate satisfactory settlement from the standpoint of high moral and military considerations is as much the United States' concern as Britain's, that in fact it is the concern of all freedom-loving, democracy-enjoying humanity. The American Administration in the United States might be prone to set too high a store by the consideration that unshaken Anglo-American co-operation, which is admittedly a primary preliminary to the defeat of the Japanese menace, should not be permitted to be disturbed or encroached into by differences over apparently extraneous problems and issues like those of India. The conscience of sections of American opinion is also probably worried on account of the fact that when there are gaping skeletons in her own domestic cupboard clamouring for attention, like the problem of the Negroes and the Red Indians, she cannot very well point

a finger of criticism and remonstrance at Britain's treatment of India. But American public opinion must crystallize and consolidate on the basis of the consideration that, if Anglo-American co-operation cannot stand the strain of the pressure from the American side regarding a fundamental military and political and ethical necessity represented by the emancipation of a vast country like India, which is the principal base for the forthcoming anti-Japanese campaign, it may not possibly stand the strain that will be imposed by the colossal problem of co-ordination and collaboration in the evolution of a world order-to-be, facilitating humanity's enjoying the Four Freedoms adumbrated by President Roosevelt. It is essential that in order to fulfil her role America, by which I mean the President himself and his Government, should extricate themselves from the cobwebs of the minor embarrassments and difficulties referred to, which are the consequences mainly of the confusion created by conflicting propagandistic slogans, and see things from the correct perspective.

For this there must be increasing realization in that country that the primary fact that President Roosevelt had enunciated the Four Freedoms imposes on his successor, as head of the American administration, the inescapable responsibility of seeing that they are translated into concrete programmes of action under the United States' guarantee. As ex-Vice-President Wallace pointed out in his widely publicized speech at the second Free World Congress, held in New York in 1942: "every freedom, every privilege has its price, its corresponding duty, without which it cannot be enjoyed."

Among these duties, Mr. Wallace mentioned as an outstanding one the duty to build a peace, just, charitable and enduring, and he explained his view of that duty further by declaring that "those who write the peace must think of the whole world." "The peace must mean a better standard of living for the common man, not merely in the United States and England, but also in India, Russia, China, and Latin America—not merely in the United Nations but also in Germany and Italy and Japan." Quite rightly put, from which follows the inexorable conclusion that the political freedom of these countries mentioned, especially countries like India, which are not free at present, is an essential preliminary to their purposeful participation in the writing of the peace, the peace of the just and the free, and to take steps which would guarantee to their people the enjoyment of a high standard of living denied to them at present.

Britain has a Beveridge Scheme of far-reaching import for the preservation of post-war social security and the U.S.A. has a similar plan for the American population. The Beveridge Scheme is an elaborate endeavour at harmonizing and integrating economic individualism with state control of the economic structure and machinery; it is a scheme which is wholly in accord with the British genius for introducing social changes of an elaborate character without affecting the basic structure of the society. Committees representing the various Allied countries are also perfecting plans for co-ordination of relief and reconstruction work of the areas decimated by Hitler's hordes. Indians may as well ask: where is a social security

plan for India, for the economic uplift of her teeming poverty-ridden population and what is the reason why no such plan is being formulated for this country? Undoubtedly we are having a number of plans for post-war reconstruction of India; but have we anything approximating to a comprehensive plan of the type of the Beveridge one? Public opinion in the United States of America may as well ask—as the Indian public have been asking repeatedly—whether Britain would release the sterling balances which have accumulated to India's credit for her benefit and when? Can world prosperity be ensured after the war with only half the world advancing along the road to social security and economic Swaraj while the other half is grovelling in poverty and economic degradation? The clamant cry of the Indian population for Freedom from Want, as I pointed out, is intimately connected with the existence of conditions capable of ensuring such freedom. The ex-Vice-President Wallace's thesis will fall to the ground if these conditions are not fulfilled.

The question may pertinently be raised by American friends: why does India expect that the problems of her political freedom and economic prosperity should receive the kind of earnest attention at the hands of the United States, as is desired? The answer to it is twofold. First, it must be realized as an inexorable truth that India's maximum co-operation, moral as well as military, which she is ever prepared to give if conditions favourable for it are created, is fundamental to the liberation of China from the vicious grip of the Japanese octopus and for reconquer-



ing Burma and Malaya which alone, in their turn, will facilitate rushing of supplies to China and finally for crushing Japan. This is a matter of immediate moment as well as of paramount importance from the United Nations' standpoint. Secondly, a free India and her whole-hearted co-operation are essential to the successful fulfilment of the peace aims of the United Nations—particularly of the United States—for the success of the cause of democracy and freedom and justice after the war and the prevention of future wars. Considerable confusion is possible when the argument that India's freedom after the war has been assured by Britain is read in juxtaposition with the argument that that assurance is conditional upon the fulfilment of some other conditions like complete internal agreement, and that it does not accord due prominence to the need for essential changes in India's governance during the war period like placing real power and responsibility in the hands of India's representative men, which will render the assurance worth-while, practical and realistic to the Indian people. The present Government of India is apparently getting on famously with India's war effort; but really, the undercurrent of political discontent in the country is so strong that its long-range effects are calculated to be disastrous unless set right in time.

For and on behalf of the United States of America, a series of advertisements appeared in the Indian newspapers some two years back emphasizing the part which that country had been playing in the present war and suggestively referring to her present and future national aims and

objectives. Presumably they were propaganda advertisements, but they cannot be considered as being divorced from, in fact they should be regarded as being closely related to, the springs of thought that pervaded the American population at the moment. One of these advertisements contained the statement that "America is pledged to recognize and support the political independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of China." It also proclaimed that the expeditionary forces of the United States were in India to defend the future of Asia and fight against 'Asia for the Japanese.' In another of these we read these forces were in India to 'help repel and crush the armies of invaders who seek to destroy freedom throughout the world.' The assurance regarding China that we have in these statements inhere an inspiring thought which evoked much warm appreciation in India. Equally inspiring was the assurance that the United States was actuated by the determination to defend Asia against falling a victim to the Japanese intentions of domination over that continent. But then in India these naturally and inevitably give rise to the question : what about the U.S.A., underwriting the post-war political independence of India, which is a base of attack against Japan, and enabling her to participate in that attack as a country assured of freedom? The 150 years old constitution of the United States declared another advertisement, contains a charter of freedom of all mankind, and their President had declared the extension of these fundamental liberties to all men as the bases of the American peoples' war aims. Should these worthy

sentiments, and should the slogan "America fights for Freedom" with which everyone of the advertisements concluded, be mere empty slogans, the immaterial declarations of pious intentions so far as India is concerned? For whose freedom America is fighting if it does not include the freedom of India?

This is a testing period for the United States in many ways. Will she come out of the test that faces her with flying colours and will she demonstrate that her public and Government possess the qualities and qualifications in an abundant degree which will enable her to play the leader in the establishment of a better world, in which freedom and justice would prevail not only in the territories on either side of the Atlantic but everywhere else? These questions clamour for an answer. Now that President Truman had succeeded as President of the Republic and will most probably be in the saddle when the peace settlement comes to be written, should he not impress on Mr. Churchill in frequent and regular meetings, that are likely to be held between them that American opinion demands that India be placed in a position facilitating her participation in the evolution of the peace structure as a free country?

The declaration about Philippine independence after liberation from Japanese occupation was an act of high idealism on the part of the President. He can impress upon Mr. Churchill that a similar declaration by Britain about India is urgently called for.

## CHAPTER VI

### **India's Interest in China's Problem**

Between China and India the cultural and other bonds connecting them are exceedingly close. Cultural and spiritual intercourse between the two countries has followed in an uninterrupted stream ever since the fourth century B.C., if not earlier. That the two countries constitute, territorially, nearly half the continent of Asia and have more than half the population of that continent is a phenomenon that lends point to the intimate relationship and the proximity of interests between them. At the present day, as much in the past, the similarity and correspondence between the political, economic and other problems which face them bear a somewhat remarkable similarity. To both economic and industrial recuperation are vital needs; both need vigorous and sustained measures by their leaders for the establishment of internal unity and integration so that they can enjoy the position in international counsels which is rightfully theirs by virtue of their size, population and strategic position. India gave China a conspicuously enlightening religious doctrine preached by the *Buddha* and China is repaying that debt by imparting to us some illuminating lessons in heroic determination and steadfastness in destroying the forces of aggression and evil. For nearly two hundred years India has been subject to foreign rule with all its deleterious political and economic consequences, while

China, though not directly under foreign rule, had suffered under sinister foreign influences for the best part of a century. Her recent history, in spite of the now widely-advertised Kuomintang Communist divergencies, is an inspiring poem in the rebuilding of the structure of a united and free China combined with an epic effort to prevent a militarist and totalitarian Japan from strangulating her hard-acquired political consciousness and consciousness of national integrity.

It is beyond my plan in these pages to refer in detail to the long-drawn agony suffered by China since her first contact with Western influences, which found a soft ground for permeation as a result of her own internally disorganised condition. It is only necessary to recall that after the Revolution of 1911, which brought to an end a once glorious but latterly ramshackle and derelict and decrepit Chinese Empire. Sun Yat Sen, father of the Revolution, whose memory is cherished with immense admiration by the Chinese people, adumbrated a 3-point programme for free China based on Nationalism, Democracy and Social Justice. It is these three high principles that have since then served as beaconlights guiding and inspiring the Chinese Nationalist Movement. In the promotion of this movement, in rescuing China from the grip of internecine strife between ardent nationalism represented by the Kuomintang Party and the violently internationalist and to some extent disintegrating forces of Communism, in unifying the country, in organizing a united front of the conflicting forces for the defence of the country against aggression and in establishing a central

Government at Nanking, which later on under the stress of military necessity had to be shifted to Chungking, and utilizing its machinery as an instrument for consolidating and reconstructing the Chinese nation on modern and rationalistic lines, the most notable part had been played by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. In the meantime a rejuvenated and modernized Japan had begun to set evil eyes on and cast evil glances at China. Manchuria was occupied by her in 1931 and a puppet State established therein. In 1937 was delivered a more terrible blow by Japan aimed at the very heart of China, the ultimate objective of which was to annex the important northern provinces, including the valuable oil-fields of Shansi, and to extend her economic influence over the rest of China and reduce it into a Japanese colony. For more than seven years now, under the inspiring leadership of the Generalissimo, who, it is greed even by his critics the Communists themselves, symbolizes and embodies China's will to unity, freedom and national independence to a determined and dogged invader, that country has been passing through something approaching hell. Her spirit, however, has remained undimmed and she remains unconquered and will remain, God willing, unconquerable.

The heroic and, for more than four years, between 1937 and 1944, single-handed and unequal struggle which China had put up against a foe, who is her definite superior in mechanical equipment and modern weapons of warfare, and which has exhibited an almost unparalleled capacity for barbarity and ruthlessness in attaining her ends,

has engendered the most widespread sympathy and admiration for China and her cause in this country. The outbreak of war in the Far East in December 1941 had, however, brought about a turn of the tide for the better. Japan's wanton aggression in the Pacific, commencing with the treacherous attack on Pearl Harbour, followed rapidly by the loss of precious British and American possessions in the Far East, induced a realization in Britain and the U.S.A. that, while in Japan they have a common enemy, in China they possess an ally possessing immense reserves of strength who should be cultivated and assisted in every possible way. China, which has been giving a most gallant and stiff fight to Japan since 1937, had come to be acknowledged as an asset of inestimable value to the Anglo-Saxon and the Allied cause generally. Common adversity had thus made them bed fellows of China, which they were once disposed to despise or regard as a country fit only to be exploited and doped. The Burma Road, the main artery for the flow of the life-blood of supplies to China which was closed in July 1940, in disregard of the military interests of China, and without any satisfactory explanation therefor, was reopened in October 1940, and machinery and equipment were dispatched to her till that avenue had been closed once again following the Japanese occupation of Burma. It is gratifying that latterly the entire strategy of the United Nations is devoted to the reopening of the Burma Road, which objective is reported to be well on the way to accomplishment now. During the past three years or more the entente between America and

Britain on the one hand and China on the other had become firmer and firmer. She has been recognized as one of the A B C D powers and accorded the status of equality among the Big Four of the United Nations. The last and the latest link in the chain of collaboration between them that has been forged was the voluntary abdication by Britain and America, in October, 1942, of the extra-territorial rights enjoyed by them in the concessional ports and in the international settlements on the Chinese mainland and the treaty concluded in that behalf in January 1943. A belated acknowledgment of the inalienable sovereignty of China, this act on the part of the Allied Nations may be regarded also as an indication of their eagerness to make necessary concessions to the deeply-cherished feelings and sentiments of a nation which has made and continues to make an enormous contribution to the common pool of the Allied resources and to resistance against aggression.

It is a fundamental part of the Allied strategy to keep Japan engaged continuously on the Chinese mainland while her advance is systematically stemmed and her strength progressively depleted in other areas in the Pacific, like the Philippines, the East Indies and Burma, where she has secured a precarious footing. The Chinese counter-offensive in July 1942, though latterly slowed down, was an indication of the magnificent manner in which she has been fulfilling the expectations entertained of her by drawing upon herself a major part of the weight of the Japanese forces. But one cannot be sure that there is—or at least was—a



complete feeling of satisfaction in China and among her leaders that the United States and Britain are—or were—doing all that they ought to assist China and to enable her to disentangle herself from the villainous grip of the enemy. Too polite to express their dissatisfaction or to lodge a vigorous protest, too much steeped in Confucian restraint and courtesy, the Chinese may not be vocally squeamish about the Allies' inadequate appreciation of her pressing and insistent needs. But a sufficient indication of their feelings was provided by the writings of well-known Chinese authors like Mr. Lin Yutung and others. "Throughout this war China has not been given a fair deal," said Mr. Lin Yutung, a noted Chinese author. "In the summer of 1940, the Burma Road was closed by England. Under the 'license' system America doubled and trebled her sale of oil to Japan from the summer of 1940 to the spring of 1941, as if China was not fighting Fascism and as if China did not have feelings to be hurt." Bitter and reproachful words these, which illustrate what a considerable leeway Britain and America have had to make to compensate China for her sacrifices in the common cause and to relieve her of at least part of the burden which she has been uncomplainingly bearing all these seven, and especially the last five, years. "China's attitude and outlook," writes Mr. Roxby, a well-known writer on Far Eastern affairs, "will be largely shaped by the character and sincerity of the help which it receives from Russia, Great Britain, and the United States, not only in the throes of its present struggle for existence but in the critical

years that will follow."

Assistance to China first, completely to rid herself of the Japanese menace and next to consolidate the whole of the Chinese territory under one strong Central Government capable of restoring order and assisting in the progress and the prosperity of the land and further enable her to assist in establishing a stable peace and democratic world order after the war, is of the utmost importance. It is not only an immediate military desideratum lent also a great and immense moral obligation which the Allied Nations have to discharge. In this view of the matter attempts which were in evidence, a year ago, to divide the war into sections, the European and the Far Eastern, and to maintain that the former should be finished first while the latter could be finished subsequently, were calculated only to prolong the agony of a country, which had been passing through an acutely critical phase of her existence for the last seven years. Even apart from the agony of China, it was an inconceivable position that Japan could be regarded as a less dangerous enemy than Germany. On this point Mr. Churchill's view about differential hemispherical war strategy was not shared not only by China and India but also by Australia and New Zealand, notwithstanding that Mr. Churchill pledged Britain and the U.S.A. to a combined and sustained effort to destroy Japanese aggression, after Hitler has been choked out of the way. "The Japanese are more dangerous than Germans," Mr. Peter Fraser, New Zealand Prime Minister, declared; and he demanded that they should be dealt with

in the same way and at the same time as the enemy in Europe. This feeling was extensively shared in Australia also and widely prevalent in China, judging from the persistent and outspoken comments in the Chinese press. It is only recently and as a result of the Ottawa and Cairo Conferences between late Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill that a different outlook had come to prevail.

But Mr. Churchill and probably President Roosevelt and the Chiefs of Military Staffs in Britain and United States at one time took a different view. So far as Mr. Churchill is concerned, his outlook and vision were remarkably clear and vivid in the appreciation of the position in Europe and the requirements of the European situation. Europe assumed in his view the foremost and pre-eminent place and the defeat of Hitler and emancipation of Europe from the Nazi yoke were extremely dear and near to his heart even when he had to resort to repressive measures himself to suppress the forces of Republicanism in Greece. Even in this all-embracing and totalitarian war, when the outcome of the war in the European continent could not be considered distinguishable from that in the Far East, when the military strategy in the various war theatres is mutually interdependent and the fortunes of war in one area act and react on those in others, Mr. Churchill permitted his prepossessions and personal predilections to take precedence over other fundamental considerations. Someone has said that discretion is not numbered among Mr. Churchill's many virtues. Nor can it be said that ability to take a comprehensive or long-range view of a particular situation is a dis-

tinguishing characteristic of his. India is his greatest blind spot and his Indian policy is patently illustrative of the fact that he has essentially a one-track mind. Strategy in global wars like the present one should be indivisible even as world peace in these days of growing international interdependence is essentially indivisible. Both these must be regarded as synthesised, integrated wholes, and they are inseparable from the evolution of principles of world peace.

## CHAPTER VII

### **Prospects of Asiatic Federation**

I have referred at length to this matter as to us in India and to the people of China the attitude of the chiefs of the United Nations referred to has incalculable significance. "Europe for the Europeans" and "Europe and European Problems First" are slogans and attitudes of mind which inevitably give rise to counter-slogans of "Asia for the Asiatics" and "Asiatic Problems and Needs First." So long as the former are indulged in, the latter cannot be avoided. And not only are they unavoidable but in them are unfortunately inherent the seeds of future conflict, which those who persist in them, and harp on them, do not apparently adequately visualize. If co-operation in the task of world reconstruction between East and West, between the brown and the black and the yellow races on the one hand and the white races on the other is to be systematically promoted, if a future world conflict is not to assume the character of a conflict of races as the present one is a conflict of ideologies and the last was a conflict of rival nationalisms, the root causes of the prospective danger must be exterminated. British or American statesmen are not contributing to this great objective of making the world safe for humanity by encouraging the belief that Europe and America matter to them more than Asia or that there is any underlying conflict, imperceptible for the present, between Europe and Asia,

and that Asia should continue to be an exploiting ground for the Western nations in perpetuity.

This aspect of the situation is of vast interest to the Indian people and to the people of China. The feelings of perfect and whole-hearted sympathy that exist among them are calculated, in the atmosphere of cordiality engendered by unity of ideas and ideals in a period of common distress, to flower into a movement whose crowning consummation will probably be an Asiatic Federation. I have made a reference to this movement in passing in the previous pages. The position of Japan in such a scheme, although she is an Asiatic nation, is indeed difficult to determine at present ; and if she persists in the pursuit and advocacy of the nefarious and evilly-inspired doctrine of an "East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere," she will find herself isolated and ostracized from the Asiatic group, and will remain ostracised so long as she will be reluctant to enter it as an equal of other Asiatic nations. Japan's attitude will, of course, be largely dependent on the issue of the present war, in which if she is worsted, as she should be, in the near future, it will mean an utterly unblest, unhonoured and unsung end of her imperialism for all time. The slogan of "Asia for the Asiatics" is not one of which anyone need be ashamed, though we must regard it as Japan's mendaciousness to utilise it for establishing and justifying her brown domination over fellow-Asiatics. Nevertheless the method of dealing with Japan once she is militarily crushed must be a matter of careful consideration in which the views of Asiatic countries must prevail. In

any case, even if Japan is left out of the picture, an Asiatic Federation will have to be regarded as not beyond the bounds of possibility with China and India taking a leading part in its establishment, particularly when the European statesmen take up the incredibly short-sighted stand they do with regard to Asiatic problems. It is a fact which must be prominently noted that the resurgent and ebullient nationalisms of Oriental countries cannot be subdued or crushed or forced to lie low, cannot be cribbed, crabbed and confined to their own shells, in the face of the self-centred predilections and policies of the European and Occidental nations. Mr. Amery may then discover that his favourite thesis that there is no distinct entity like Asia and that India in particular has more in common with the British Empire than any other Asiatic country, will have collapsed like a house of cards. India's adherence to Britain and her participation in the British Empire or Commonwealth scheme is essentially conditional on the treatment which she will receive at Britain's hands. What has been said above is an additional and forceful argument which should induce Britain to re-examine without any delay the future of her relationship with India, keeping clearly in view where India's sympathies and hopes are likely to be in the post-war era.

The above considerations indicate how among the Allied Nations China occupies now a pre-eminent position and how her wishes and intentions towards India in particular and towards the problems of post-war reconstruction in general will necessarily have to be taken into account by

the United Nations. In this regard, the outstanding consideration to bear in mind is that China is likely to demand that, along with her own independent and equal place among nations, and the maintenance of her territorial integrity by the restoration to her of Manchuria and other Japanese occupied portions of China, India's freedom and equality should also be assured. Marshal Chiang Kai-shek and Madame Chiang's visit to India in February 1942 had evoked an outburst of spontaneous enthusiasm for the Chinese cause on the part of the Indian people of all sections which is not diminished by the recent attempts to discredit the Generalissimo by painting him as a semi-dictator and not as the leader of a democratic China because he refused to accommodate the Communists in all their demands. The two visitors created an immense impression on the Indian public and by their contact with prominent Indians have laid the foundation for a deep and abiding friendship between the two countries. Marshal Chiang's last statement before leaving India contained words of profound and far-sighted wisdom and sound advice to Britain which, however, seems to have been lost on those directing British policy towards the country. "I sincerely hope and I confidently believe," he said, "that our ally, Great Britain, without waiting for any demands on the part of the people of India, will, as speedily as possible, give them real political power so that they may be in a position further to develop their spiritual and material strength and thus realise that their participation in the war is not merely an aid to the anti-aggressive nations for securing victory



but also a turning point in their struggle for India's freedom. From an objective point of view I am of opinion that this would be the wisest policy which will redound to the credit of the British Empire."

China has need of Allied assistance in an increasing measure during and after the war even as the Allies have need of China's continued co-operation and active help in vanquishing the common enemy. So long as this position lasts China's voice cannot be ignored by Britain or America. In the post-war reconstruction she will have a tremendous say; rightly has the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang decided that the problem of post-war reconstruction be undertaken simultaneously with the effective prosecution of the war. And if one reads the signs aright, she can be depended upon to utilise her important position in the counsel of the United Nations, firstly, to press for the release of India from Britain's grip; secondly, to press for a genuine international peace settlement in which economic and political domination of one nation by another will cease; and thirdly, to press for a position of absolute and perfect equality of the Asiatic nations with European and Western nations and for the universal application of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. Fighting the war as she has been doing for the preservation of her own freedom and national integrity and independence and of the essential values of her ancient civilization, she is bound to insist on the fulfilment of these conditions as the precondition of a better world order. As Mr. Roxby has said in his pamphlet "China" (Oxford University

press) "potentially China is one of the greatest of the world democracies and it is difficult to overestimate the significance of its future role." In reality, a more straightforward, clear-cut, unambiguous statement of the Chinese view-point than that contained in Marshal Chiang's message to the Forum organised by New York "Herald Tribune" nearly two years back is difficult to come across. "China has no desire to replace the Western imperialism or to introduce isolationism of its own or of anyone else," he declared. "We hold that we must advance from the narrow idea of exclusive alliances and regional *blocs*, which in the end make for bigger and more bitter wars, to an effective organisation for world unity. Unless real world co-operation replaces both isolationism and imperialism in a new interdependent world of free nations, there will be no lasting security for you (the U.S.A.) or for us." These words breathe a lofty idealism, display a keen sense of realities and reveal an analysis, in a clear but concise form, of the basic malady of the world and the remedy which will effectively cure it. They are reflected on the good work done by the Chinese delegation at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, though the world security scheme formulated thereat leaves many gaps to be filled up before it can be regarded as a complete scheme for world security.

China will not countenance the United Nations exploiting their victory, for sustaining either British or any other imperialism of any complexion. She will, I am sure, refuse equally stoutly to be a party to the principle of complete

isolationism of nations as opposed to a virile internationalism, which is the best safeguard for a virile as different from a debased nationalism. She will also demand that the future world order should be broadbased essentially on the foundation of purposeful co-operation among nations, which only equality of opportunity and freedom from extraneous thralldom for all nations can assure. World security, lasting, real, and effective, can be the result only of the fulfilment of this condition; otherwise the foundation will have been laid not for world security but for the outbreak in the future of more devastating wars on the one hand and for soul-killing political and economic exploitation of some countries by the others on the other. We anxiously hope and anticipate at the same time that Chiang Kai-shek will do everything possible and necessary to remove the edge of the criticisms of his policy by friendly, apart from hostile, critics by making essential changes in the administrative structure of China which will render the Kuomintang Government broadbased on the democratic principles.

Whether Mr. Churchill interpreted and regarded Marshal Chiang's message to the "Herald Tribune" and to the British Government in India as a reply to his Empire-preservation ideal or not cannot be divined though the suspicion that he did may not be entirely foundationless. But that it is an indirect challenge to the politicians and statesmen of Britain and America that they must utilise the Allied victory to evolve a world order on the unexceptionable principles of international co-operation

and equality and freedom of nations is the inevitable conclusion to be drawn from it. Mr. Churchill would, however, be a wise man, the maker of a better world, if he modifies his view-point about not permitting the liquidation of the British Empire during his term of Prime Ministership in the light of Marshal Chiang's forthright message. The latter represents not only the considered view of the accredited leader of the Chinese people who, according to Mr. Mike Mansfield, representative of President Roosevelt to China, "the only great leader who could unify China" but with remarkable precision it represents also the view-point of the average nationalist Indian towards world problems of the future. In point of fact, if the message were being given by an Indian leader like Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Nehru or Sir T. B. Saprú, or any one else, from the Indian point of view, he could not clothe it in different or more expressive language. It exemplifies the close approximation of the thoughts of an eminent Chinese statesman to the thoughts and ideas that actuate the general body of Indians. Both China and India want and must possess complete freedom for themselves as nations; but at the same time they want also that a sincere, genuine international spirit, which would guarantee the freedom of every country and preserve world peace against the rapacity of dictators and totalitarian Powers in the future, should pervade the post-war peace settlement.

Apart from the immense possibility of China, presenting a solid phalanx of opposition to an attempt on the part of any nation or a combination endeavouring to dominate world politics for

selfish ends, she is the one nation that can assume the lead in promoting the Pan-Asiatic Federation referred to above. Provided the Asiatic nations unerringly place before themselves the ideal of international peace and national freedom for every nation and provided they continuously keep partnership in the common cause of peace and progress and not domination and exploitation as their guiding motive, an Asiatic Federation should be welcomed as a potential bulwark for the maintenance of future peace. In any case this will be the one answer which Europe and America will receive if, at this time, they do not discard theories of racial superiority and colour bar, which constitute the worst manifestations of man's injustice to man and nation's to nation, and act up to the high principles which they profess. With China in such circumstances will necessarily go India, Persia, Afghanistan, Tibet and Burma. Otherwise too, a World Commonwealth, on which men's vision are being increasingly focussed, presupposes some kind of regional federal organisation which will serve as the bases therefor and of which it will constitute the apex. An Asiatic Federation can be such a regional organisation and from that standpoint should commend itself to all advocates of a world organisation.

India is genuinely gratified by the enormous and lively interest that her problems and her future destiny have stimulated in other Asiatic countries in general and in China in particular. "Should freedom be denied to either China or India, there could be no real peace in the world,"

declared Generalissimo Chiang in his farewell message to India's people on February 21, 1942, and thereby contributed to the cementing of the 2000-year old intercourse between the two countries. Mr. Willkie in his "One World" quoted 'the wisest man in China' as saying that "when the aspiration of India for freedom was put aside on some future date, it was not Great Britain that suffered in public esteem in the Far East, it was the United States." At one and the same time it illustrates the passionate feeling that prevails in China about India's freedom and contains also a strong though indirect remonstrance to Britain and much more to America that the problem of India's freedom should be an important plank in their present and post-war plans. While the people of India would closely watch the events in China and earnestly hope that the Kuomintang-Communist differences would be patched up without delay, they welcome China's support to her unity and freedom. The moral justification, the practical necessity and the fundamental correctness of the demand made on behalf of India are unquestionable. And what is morally justified and essential cannot be politically unsound or impracticable. It will be a disastrous confession of moral bankruptcy if this great consideration is ignored by the party mainly concerned, namely, Great Britain.

## CHAPTER VIII

### Post-War World and India's Status

I now come to the end of what I have to say. It is only necessary to emphasize, rather re-emphasize, that in the majestic procession of events and the overwhelming nature of the situation created by the war is embedded a supreme opportunity for the United Nations, especially their leaders, which they can utilize either for transforming the world into a better, a safer and more secure place to live in or switch it back to a condition wherein security for nations as well as individuals will be absent, where one part of humanity will live either in perpetual thralldom and slavery or another in perpetual fear and want and haunted by the spectre of war. The firmest foundation for peace and security can be laid only on the basis of a true, stable internationalism. My firm conviction is that national boundaries need not be swept away or national independence destroyed to attain this kind of internationalism. Nations can exist and must exist and national rights and independence maintained. We cannot get round, at least not yet, the imperative fact that national pride and national ideals are an integral part of our being and that in most countries the people are not prepared to abandon them completely. The incipient nationalism of large portions of the world and of some big countries like China and India demands an opportunity for purposeful expression even when they may be prepared to co-oper-

ate in the evolution of a new world order. It is, however, imperative that nationalism should not be permitted to be a vicious force for the practice of perverted theories of national or racial superiority. Nationalism of the brand for which India and Indian traditions stand from time immemorial, which is based essentially on the principle of "live and let live", is what the world stands in need of; it must be the brand which will prove an effective factor in the advancement of the true spirit and purpose of internationalism itself. What India stands for in this regard has been explained in his usual striking and picturesque language by India's great philosopher-educationist Sir S. Radhakrishnan, in the course of his speech at the Benares Hindu University Convocation in November 1942. He said:

"India never stood for national and cultural isolation. Her spiritual heights rest on a basis that embraces all humanity. Wherever men love reason, shun darkness, turn towards light, praise virtue, despise meanness, hate vulgarity, kindle sheer beauty, wherever minds are sensitive, hearts generous, spirits free, there is India. Let us adopt that loyalty to humanity instead of a sectional devotion to one part of the human race."

The exhortation which Sir S. Radhakrishnan addressed to the youth of his country and his countrymen in general can as well be the exhortation which should be addressed to the United Nations of the present war and particularly to their leader states, the United States of America, Britain, Russia and China. The world order to which they should set



their hands and which they can oppose to the Axis world order should be broadbased on the principles of national and cultural synthesis and co-operation, not cultural isolation or political domination of one country over another. They should enthrone the principle of loyalty to humanity in preference to the diminutive and lesser ideal of sectional or racial glorification. But at the same time they should make an earnest endeavour to preserve the individuality and initiative of the various sections unimpaired.

As a preliminary and as an earnest of their willingness and preparedness to adhere to and promote these high ideals, which during the war they had been professing with fervidness, they should accomplish certain things immediately. The first and foremost obligation that rests on them is to evolve a new policy *vis-a-vis* the colonies and the dependencies which are under their political control, which will approximate to and accord with the principles of the Atlantic Charter. It is fundamentally and ethically an unconvincing idea that you can reconstruct a twentieth century world with minds impregnated with nineteenth century conceptions of diplomacy and colonial imperialism, because it is an idea which is based on the untenable principle of the world being kept half free and half slave. The shedding of this latter kind of mentality is indispensable for the realization of the former ideal. But there is distressingly little evidence that among Conservative circles in England there is intimate heart-searching on this score. On the other hand there is self-satisfaction, self-deception, self-praise and self-emulation.

an abundant measure in the official policy propounded by Lord Cranborne some time ago. The central thesis of the (then) Colonial Secretary's statement is that in regard to that policy "the old idea of exploitation gave place to the new doctrine of trusteeship," and this he coupled with the assertion that "the British colonial system is not coming to an end." Taken together, as they can conveniently be, Lord Cranborne's statement under reference and Mr. Churchill's statement asserting his determination to prevent a liquidation of the British Empire, constitute the most serious and gloomy warnings to all whom it may concern that certain sections of British public opinion will make a last vigorous and resolute stand on behalf of the British Colonial Empire and for its survival at the end of war.

On the other hand each one of the points and self-plaudits of Lord Cranborne contained in that pronouncement individually as well as all of them combined are susceptible of easy refutation and are open to perfectly legitimate criticism. The doctrine of trusteeship, as pointed out earlier in these pages, is a thoroughly discredited doctrine in the present age, whatever may have been its justification in the nineteenth century; and unregenerate diehards resurrect it in times of stress and utilize it as an argument to salve their imperialistic consciences. Trusteeship, in any form exercised, does not bless the trustee, nor does it bless the subject of the trust; it hardens and corrodes the souls of both. Some extremely backward territories of the earth in the continent of Africa or some islands in the Pacific

region may be appropriate areas for the exercise of the doctrine of trusteeship by other nations. In other areas trusteeship has so far been synonymous mainly with economic exploitation of their virgin soils and natural resources interspersed with periodical adumbration of liberal intentions and mild and harmless doses of self-government, the extent and the pace of which, it is claimed, are invariably determinable by the trustee himself. In any case not one of the countries specially mentioned by Lord Cranborne, namely, East and West Africa; Ceylon, Malta and Fiji can be regarded as areas appropriate to the continued application of the principle of political spoon-feeding inherent in trusteeship, while what happened in Malaya, Singapore and Burma, in 1942, affords disconcerting illustration of the manner in which the trusteeship over those regions was exercised by Britain. On the other hand the contention that trusteeship is essential for the welfare of the people of the countries mentioned, constitutes a condemnation of British policy and not a commendation thereof. No claim to enlightened safeguarding of the interests of the area which she had taken under trust can be advanced by Britain, if after decades of such trusteeship the area is economically impoverished and politically incapable of managing its own affairs. No wonder at the recent Pacific Relations Conference and at the United Nations Conference the view was vigorously expressed that subject peoples regard the professions of the trustees with grave suspicion. The further plea advanced by Lord Cranborne that trusteeship promotes good

overnment of the colonies also holds precious title water. It cuts across the principle pregnant with profound wisdom and statesmanship enun-  
 iated by Sir Campbell Bannerman, that "good government can in no case be considered a substitute for self-government."

The United Nations should also decide upon policy with reference to the enemy countries which will not be blackened by traces of vindictiveness and eagerness to warp and destroy the latter's national souls. Towards the enemy countries, the policy should indubitably be one of demolishing completely the foundations on which their political structures had been erected, not the destruction of their political independence or national identity. While resuscitating and renovating the suppressed and down-trodden spirit of the common people, by infusing in them hope and confidence in the future of their own inalienable freedom as individuals and in the security and independence of their countries, by means of education, propaganda and sympathetic handling of their problems, they should be induced to cultivate a new angle of vision, to abhor the vicious, soul-killing nature of the tyranny which they had to submit to. Vindictiveness, on the other hand, reminiscent of the attempt to fix the war guilt solely on Germany after the 1914-18 war, breeds hatred, vengeance, despair and frustration in a proud and self-conscious people like the Germans, the inevitable and inescapable sequel to which will be another war and the accentuation of the international ill-will which it is our supreme task now to extirpate. On this subject of the treat-

ment to be accorded to Germany and Japan a considerable amount of literature is now available and Vansittartism had almost developed into a creed of unqualified vengeance against Germany.

Dismemberment of Germany, sterilization of the German population, distribution of the Germans over widely scattered areas and so on are some of the remedies suggested to prevent Germany from resorting to unprovoked aggression and provoking another world war in another quarter of a century. Occupation of Japan and parcelling it out among the United Nations, destruction of her industrial potential and abolition of the institution of Emperorship are some of the proposals adumbrated in respect of Japan. The fundamental question is whether these vengeance-breathing remedies will successfully destroy the root causes of German and Japanese potentialities for aggression in future. They are rejected by most sane people in America and Britain as incapable of attaining the end in view and that view is shared by large sections of thoughtful Indians too. Indians, as a race, whether Hindus or Muslims, are not motivated or actuated by feelings of national or individual hatred and they do not believe that any nation or people as a whole can be or is so utterly sadistic, so utterly cruel, so utterly given to ideal of aggrandizement and making war as to be unreformable by peaceful means or by being subjected to the right kind of education and training. Germany and Japan have waged an unrelenting war in pursuit of their totalitarian policies, a large number of German and Japanese soldiers have clearly resorted to the most despicable sadistic

practices while dealing with their prisoners of war or with conquered people. But their psychology in this respect is not separable from their training, education and the militaristic and racial superiority ideas, unceasingly driven into their ears from their childhood. They are in most, if not all, cases the unsuspecting victims of their environment and their training and must be capable of being remoulded into a different kind of people by systematic efforts at their reformation and by sustained endeavours to inculcate into and educate them in the art of peace. It may be a difficult, and probably prolonged, experiment, but an experiment which is worth trying in substitution of the experiment of ruthless extermination of them as races or as the members of a country's population. The angle from which India and China look at this problem is indeed different from the angle from which the average Westerner looks at it. If Germany under Hitler or the Japanese addicted to the Emperor-worship ideal have proved themselves to be inhuman barbarians according to ordinary moral conceptions, the Allied nations need not emulate them by giving a free vent to their vengeance complex. Even barbarians can be educated and turned into refined human beings by proper treatment. India's contribution to the discussion on this question will be one based on her immemorial traditions of *ahimsa* and love and she will undoubtedly be supported in that plan by some other countries.

Their next big task is to see that the problem of India which, to an Indian like myself, constitutes the most striking and profoundly disturbing

interrogation mark staring the Allies in the face and challenging their immediate attention, is properly tackled. The justice, relevancy and importance of India's demand for immediate transfer of power to her own nationals and for complete freedom immediately after the war are impossible to ignore when dispassionately considered. I will emphasize once again that what is essential is that the recognition of the justice of the cause must be concretized without delay as an important part of the United Nations' war strategy and of their peace plans. In the last Great War, Indian armies fought side by side with the Allied armies in different theatres of war and made an enormous contribution to a glorious victory. Their sacrifices, however, did not succeed in securing a commensurate measure of freedom for their country. The Montague-Chelmsford Reforms formulated in the wake of the last war inherited a very inadequate concession to India's contribution to victory in World War No. I while the Jallianwala Bagh tragedy came as an extremely unpalatable reminder of the subordinate position of India and as a counter-blow to the limited initiative transferred to Indians by those reforms.

Subsequent events in India have not demonstrated that Britain's attitude to Indian freedom has changed in any considerable measure. It is beyond the scope of these pages to review those events in detail. The Government of India Act of 1935 is indubitably a complicated and comprehensive measure of legislation; but so far as its integral merits as a charter of freedom for India is concerned, it really withheld more than

t conceded in the shape of real power to Indians. One part of it relating to Federation had to be suspended owing to the compelling nature of the opposition to it from various parties for various reasons and the other part relating to provincial autonomy had to experience rough weather in seven provinces after a trial of only two-and-a-half years. The Cripps' Mission came later, bringing a Draft Declaration on behalf of the British War Cabinet, whose single good feature embodying an assurance of the country's post-war independence was more than counterbalanced by the insistent refusal of the British Government to demonstrate their earnestness in that regard by acquiescing in imperative immediate political changes and by the incorporation therein of the debilitating and disintegrating principle of provincial secession. World War No. II found India eager and anxious to maximise her contribution to Axis vanquishment but denied an opportunity of doing so and her sons are willing to make sacrifices in the achievement of that consummation if only conditions had been favourable. Indian soldiers, airmen and sailors are fighting as gallantly, as valiantly and as steadfastly as those of any other Allied nations, if not better but for what cause most of them are unable to say. Their achievements have been monumentalized in the unqualified tributes paid to them by commanders and generals of the British race as well as by others and even the description of a "mercenary" army given to it by Mr. William Phillips was an indictment more of the way in which they are recruited and less of their personal heroism or



bravery. Educated young Indians as well as Indian peasants and workers had enlisted in ever-increasing numbers in the fighting forces and demonstrated the inherent absurdity of the contention that Indians would not be able to defend their country if the British troops were withdrawn. Fifteen years ago at the Round Table Conferences there was furious controversy even over the acceptance of the principle that India's defence should be increasingly the concern of Indians themselves. Since then, and especially since the outbreak of the present war, we have travelled many miles ahead and the achievements of the Indian fighting men in the war are so striking that none can dare dispute hereafter the country's capacity to undertake the defence of her independence. In any case that argument cannot be advanced by any British politician to obstruct India's attainment of freedom.

An unqualified acceptance of India's right to manage her own affairs is the only method by which India's sacrifices for the common cause can be adequately requited. If the greater and more extensive contribution of which they are capable is not made by Indians, it should be ascribed primarily to British policy, which stands in the way of its evocation. The demand made by Indian political parties in regard to the country's freedom, must, therefore, be interpreted as complementary to and as an extension of the unspoken demand for the same purpose made by Indian fighting men from different parts of the country and belonging to different communities through their heroic deeds on the fields of battle. As a

matter of fact, among these latter the fire of patriotism burns as brightly and as greatly as among the politically-minded sections. There is among them as keen and unbounded a desire for their country's independence from extraneous control as among the generality of the civilian population and the unity that prevails among them transcends all communal business which was our political life. Considered in this light the attitude of some of our countrymen towards the present war, and particularly towards those who have enlisted for service therein, is a matter for profound regret. For their attitude the justification consists, however, in Britain's dismal failure in the past to fulfil her own promises and assurances to India and her disinclination to be unequivocally clear regarding India's independence after the war. Legitimately it can be asserted by Indians that Britain has on too many occasions in the past made promises to India with the lips only to be broken to the heart.

And then there is another vital factor which aggravates India's suspicions of Britain's intentions instead of reassuring her. I believe that it involves incalculable injury to Britain's reputation for moral candour and her prestige for political honesty if the impression, which already is widely prevalent, gains further ground that she offered some terms of political settlement to India when the war situation was slightly discouraging for her or when enemy action was imminent or threatened against India in the beginning of 1942 and withdrew them as soon as the situation improved and the danger receded. Sir Stafford

Cripps arrived in India with his ill-fated offer when a Japanese invasion of India was generally supposed to be in the offing and when the United Nations' military fortunes reached a low ebb in the Far East with the conquest of Malaya and the capitulation of Singapore. But by a coincidence the negotiations broke down and the offer was withdrawn when the Japanese fleet sustained a reverse in the Bay of Bengal and the air attacks over Colombo proved a costly adventure for Japan which neutralized and crippled her capacity for undertaking an invasion of India at least for the time being. Similarly it is clear from all accounts that the war danger had receded from the Indian borders and Indian shores at least for some time to come because Japan had sustained serious naval reverses in the Solomon Islands and their attempted "token" invasion of India in the middle of 1944 was successfully repelled and ended in a dismal failure and the Allies' advance into Burma is making satisfactory headway. The British Government might, therefore, feel that they can afford to allow the Indian problem to take care of itself and that they need not worry themselves much about the promotion of a settlement now that the plans for reconquest of Burma by the S.E.A.C. are prospering. An attitude like this is, however, the limit of short-sighted reactionarism and petty-fogging political evasion, which it should be difficult to associate with Mr. Churchill, who has been the principal driving force behind Britain's unflagging resistance to Axis aggression but with which his name has in fact become associated.

It is a fundamentally hand-to-mouth policy unworthy of Britain to follow and unworthy of being followed by her in the case of a country like India.

We in this country also regard it as of pre-eminent importance that India should have been represented in her own right at the San Francisco Conference and at the council table around which would congregate the representatives of the United Nations to negotiate and formulate the terms of peace when the present clash of arms has terminated in victory in the East also. The Rt. Hon'ble V. S. Srinivasa Sastri has in recent months been assiduously publicizing and propagandizing this point of view and has served in a large measure to focus public attention thereon. That India's representatives at the Peace Conference cannot be expected to play the part of gramophone registering the desires and the will of an extraneous authority like the Secretary of State for India and incapacitated by reason of the political subordination of their country from making any specific and independent contribution to the evolution of the peace structure. They must be the chosen of the Indian people and they must be in a position to speak out, without fear or favour and with a genuine understanding of the great issues at stake the real mind and express the real will of the Indian people and impress on the world how and why India regards the recurrence of world-enveloping and world-destroying wars as periodical menaces to man's progress and spiritual evolution to a higher and nobler life and how they should be avoided. Mass murder on an

unprecedented scale even for such mass murder which modern wars evolve is patently repugnant to this evolutionary process.

It is impossible for human progress in the real sense of the term to be a sustained and continuous process when every quarter of a century what has been achieved in the previous interval of peace is destroyed by the forces of hell and retrogression let loose. All religions abhor this process of man's scientific and inventive genius being prostituted for the obliteration of man himself though it may be recognized that war is an essential evil in certain circumstances. Christ preached peace, good-will, and purposeful love among God's creation; but that Christian civilization has regrettably departed to such an extent from Christ's preachings of peace and good-will among men that it elevates destructive war to the position of the principal method of settling man's disputes with man and nation's disputes with nation is a most damaging and distressing indictment of that civilization. Hindu philosophy has from time immemorial induced a feeling of hatefulness towards war for the sake of war among the followers of that religion and permeated with this feeling, Indian representatives will place before the world, provided they are afforded a satisfactory opportunity, the lofty principles of human brotherhood, respect for the individual as individual and justice, which are the essential ingredients of lasting and permanent peace. This consideration should impress itself on the leaders of the United Nations, on whose shoulders will devolve the responsibility for post-

war reconstruction, so that they can realize the immense need for securing India's presence at the confabulations for peace as an independent and freedom-enjoying land.

To the ideal of international peace the most practical and most conspicuous contribution that India can be depended upon to make will be the principle of non-violence. Apparently violence is inherent in the law of nature and war in general and modern war in particular is a gruesome evidence of the manner in which that law manifests itself in international affairs. Elimination of wars which will be a primary factor in cementing international co-operation in the future, can be an accomplished fact when, firstly, the root causes of war are destroyed, and, secondly, when violence and war as methods of reconciling international antagonisms are substituted by non-violence and settlement by negotiation. At present the real significance of true non-violence is vitiated by large sections of public opinion in the world, and even in India, regarding it from the wrong perspective and by the entirely misleading notions entertained of its implications. One of these notions is that it justifies abject and humiliating surrender of peace-loving nations to international brigandism and that it involves pacifism of the extreme variety, which may have its roots in national cowardice. That is a wholly wrong approach to a great principle; on the other hand the more appropriate way of looking at it is to consider non-violence not as justifying a nerveless and doctrinaire pacifism but as a dynamic, forceful principle of conduct which demands that men

should strive for peace and promotion of good-will by neutralizing the aggressive intentions of dictators and totalitarian powers. Let international justice prevail; let all nations feel that they are equal to one another; let the root causes of national cupidity be eradicated and directly you have non-violence in action as a preservative of peace. And since non-violence of this character is broadbased on respect for law, righteous and just law, it will be realized that it is the best method for establishing international law on a sound basis and preventing gratuitous violations of its obligations by power-proud or militaristically-minded nations. It is indubitable that one of the guarantees for the preservation of peace is respect for law on the part of nations even as respect for law among individuals is the guarantee for social security and peace. For enforcing this respect the establishment of an International Court of Justice, with sufficient sanctions behind it, will appear essential. Into the post-war peace structure should, therefore, be woven the constitution of such a legal machinery which can effectively maintain the principle of International Rule of Law.

An attitude of non-violence of the nature mentioned is what the world as a whole needs to cultivate most, so as to lend point to the tremendous revulsion of feeling that is engendered in men's minds by the hates, the discords and more than all by the distress and the destruction that the war has produced. India as the spiritual home of the non-violence ideal has a nearly 3000-year old history behind her. World-famous teachers like the Buddha and Mahavira transformed non-

violence into a bed-rock principle of the religions they founded and propagated. In the present century, Mahatma Gandhi, the prophet of Indian nationalism, has re-emphasized and renovated that doctrine and has spent almost a life-time endeavouring to inculcate its significance and beneficialness in the conduct of man's affairs. To ascertain the exact extent of the success of his preachings in this regard is a difficult process at present, but the psychological effects it has produced among large sections of the Indian population, including even those who are not directly the Mahatma's disciples in politics, constitute a distinguishing feature of Indian public life during the last two-and-a-half decades. These years of India's political history bear ample and convincing testimony to the influence that non-violence has exerted on people's thoughts and modes of life, though it is possible that it could easily have been greater if its underlying implications are more widely appreciated.

It must be admitted at the same time that the ideal is susceptible not merely of a limited or parochial application but possesses a universal significance. In the consideration of the problems of permanent peace and post-war reconstruction it therefore follows that a firm adherence to non-violence will produce wholly satisfactory and salutary repercussions on world peace. Ceaselessly humanity has been striving to attain conditions in which human concord, brotherhood and co-operation will predominantly prevail. But its search for these conditions has proved so far elusive and illusory. Scientific progress while tending to pro-



mote human happiness has been exploited also to aggravate human misery, for attaining destructive rather than constructive ends. It is a tremendous task to switch men's minds from thoughts of violence and conflict to thoughts of peace and love, which is the essential preliminary to the destruction of the Hitlers of all times. It will be India's duty and her privilege to emphasize these considerations and to secure their acceptance at the Peace Conference.

Once again the above analysis leads us to the irresistible and vital conclusion that India's freedom is a preliminary postulate to enable her to make her contribution to this great and grand consummation. In the absence of an unwavering and unflinching advocate, even principles of incontestable merit are liable to get lost in blind and unappreciative opposition or indifference to them. At the Peace Conference table, unless there is purposeful idealism animating and guiding those present, frayed tempers and vengeful hearts are likely to get the better of statesmanship and the high ideals oft-professed during a period of war. Democracy, freedom and justice and other war-time slogans vociferously proclaimed by politicians stand even now in danger of being relegated to the status of platitudes to be bandied about and probably ultimately bundled out, as it happened at the time of the formulation of the Treaty of Versailles. A free India's representatives, on the other hand, will be able to pin the assembled peace-makers to non-violence as the basic principle of lasting peace. As an Indian, I am terribly anxious, not only for the sake of my

own country but for the sake of humanity at large, that through the cussedness of reactionary British diehards or unimaginative Indian political partisans, India should not be prevented from fulfilling her mission in the interests of the most colossal of all causes—lasting and permanent peace, and freedom, progress and prosperity of nations.